View Full Version : Majid Nawaz's thoughts on HT

05-09-2007, 20:40
Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir's Theo-political Stance
- Part 1-
Maajid Nawaz

The first in a series of articles reviewing Islamist political theory


As followers of Hizbut-Tahrir (The Liberation Party) are by now aware, after affiliation to the Party since I was 16, I took the painful yet vital step of resigning from its UK leadership committee and leaving the Party. Members of the Party are rightfully owed an explanation. Acting on the advice of my friends in the UK Party leadership I delayed issuing this explanation from fear that my words would be misconstrued by others. Thus, with Allāh as my witness, I have taken the decision to finally issue this article after much delay and thought in order to clarify my stance and attempt to open up a new chapter in the mindset of politically active Muslims. In the current climate, I can only emphasise that I do not wish my critical voice to be exploited to support the call for proscribing Hizbut-Tahrir. Rather, those that are well versed in both Party ideology and traditional Islamic sciences are sufficiently equipped and duty-bound to redress the phenomenon of politically inspired theological interpretations. I would also state that my political stance against the tragic invasion of Iraq remains unchanged. Furthermore, these words should not be taken to mean that I support the brutal policies of the Muslim world?s dictators, rather political engagement is the civic duty of all who are able. Finally, I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis, rather a counter-reformation and a return to its true essence by Muslims insisting that their religion is not used merely to serve narrow political agendas.

I spent much of my time as a political prisoner in Egypt (2002-2006) evaluating and studying traditional Islamic sciences. With the passing of time it became ever clearer to me that rather than being the sole vanguard that represents an Islām that even Muslim jurists have misunderstood, Hizbut-Tahrir is inspired by a political ideology super-imposed upon an Islamic legal analysis. In other words, today's world in the eyes of Hizbut-Tahrir is analysed through a prism of political Ijtihād (theological legal reasoning). Their political Ijtihād (pl. Ijtihādāt) is the basis for a revolutionary call to transform Muslim countries from what is deemed Dār al-Kufr (contra-Islamic land) to Dār al-Islām (Islamic lands) and from what are considered Kufr (contra-Islamic) states to a unitary 'Islamic state'. This task entails the forceful overthrow of all regimes in the Muslim world as they are judged to be ruling by Kufr laws thus they lack Shari'ah legitimacy, the final arbiter in legal disputes. Authority for this political stance is gained from citing religious scripture interpreted via the Party's principles of Islamic jurisprudence. As my understanding of Islām grew, however, I realised that the very scripture and principles used by the Party to make its analysis do not actually support its call. Rather, and quite distressingly for me at first, the Party's own principles result in the exact opposite conclusion. It is with this introduction that I embark upon demonstrating how the Party's own theological, intellectual and legal principles, when applied to their political conclusions, result only in the invalidity of Hizbut-Tahrir's political stance.

Hizbut-Tahrir on Dār al-Islām1

The Islamic and Contra-Islamic Lands:

Party members are obliged to believe that the whole world today is Dār al-Kufr (contra-Islamic land), synonymous in its literature to Dār al-harb (land of war)2.

?These lands in which Muslims currently live throughout the world, their reality is that they are all Dār al-Kufr and not Dār al-Islām.?3

The Party leadership then stipulated two conditions for Dār al-Islām:

a) The land must be ?governed by the laws of Islām.?4

b) ?Security (Amān 5) is maintained by the security of Islām ie: by the authority and protection of Muslims inside and outside the land, even if the majority of its inhabitants are non-Muslims?.6

Dār al-Kufr is conversely defined as the land

??governed by the laws of Kufr, and whose security is not maintained by the security (Amān) of Islām ie: by other than the authority and security of Muslims, even if the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims.?7

Proof for these two conditions is asserted rationally and with various Koranic verses and hadith narrations brought forward to support each condition. After listing evidence to demonstrate that the appearance of Kufr laws is sufficient to negate the first condition of Dār al-Islām, it is stated,

?So these texts indicate that to rule with anything other than the laws of Allāh is a matter which makes it obligatory upon Muslims to declare war against the ruler, and it is an evidence which indicates that implementing Islām is a condition for having Dār al-Islām, otherwise the ruler must be fought against.?8

Therefore, Party theory holds that there can be no 'Islamic State' without firstly the land being Dār al-Islām by these two conditions. The Party accepts, however, that security of Muslim lands is in the hands of Muslims. It is only by the absence of the first condition of ruling by Islām, therefore, that the lands are deemed Dār al-Kufr,

?...it is evident that all the current Muslim lands do not fulfil the condition of the laws of Islām. Though the security (Amān) of most of them is maintained by the security and authority of Muslims.?9

The land being Dār al-Islām, however, is not synonymous in Party literature to the regimes being Islamic. This is because a scenario is envisaged where a land may be Dār al-Islām, but then the ruler begins initiating what are considered Kufr laws. The Party believes that only in such circumstances are the people obliged to fight the ruler,

?The aim in the current situation is not to change a ruler who rules by Kufr in Dār al-Islām; the aim is rather to change the whole of Dār al-Kufr, including its thoughts and systems...If in Dār al-Islām, which is ruled according to the revelation of Allāh (swt), its ruler ruled with clear Kufr then the Muslims must forbid it, so that he reverts back to ruling according to Islām. In case he doesn't repent, it becomes imperative upon the Muslims to take up arms against him to force him to revert to ruling with the revelation of Allāh (swt).?10

Today, the world is believed by the Party to be Dār al-Kufr in origin due to the unprecedented move by Mustafa Kemal in dismantling the Ottoman Caliphate after the First World War, and colonialist occupation of other Muslim lands, eventually giving rise to client regimes. Therefore, fighting to remove today's rulers ?who rule by Kufr? is deemed by the Party as being based on a misunderstanding of the reality and its Shari'ah rule, as such action only applies to rulers who initiate Kufr laws within an existent Dār al-Islām, whereas today the Muslims lands are already Dār al-Kufr.

Rather, the Party draws an analogy to the Prophet's (peace be upon him) own life in Dār al-Kufr, Mecca, up until he gained authority in Yathrib (later named Madinah) making it Dār al-Islām. The Prophet (peace be upon him) is perceived by the Party to have engaged in a purely political and intellectual mission to remove the Kufr system in place, until he (peace be upon him) amassed enough support from the military tribes of Yathrib that he ?orchestrated a coup d'etat?11 removing the powerless king-to-be in Yathrib, 'Ubay ibn Sulūl. This interpretation is then used by the Party to call the military or other forces of power in Muslim countries (named in Party terminology the Nuşrah12, or material support) to remove illegitimate regimes by force in a coup d'etat.

?(This would) normally be done by the Party seeking to access the military in order to take the authority...After this the military would be capable of establishing the authority of Islām. Hence a coup d'etat would be the manifestation of a political change...?13

Therefore, the Muslim world being Dār al-Kufr is axiomatic to the Party's analysis. The aim being one of changing Dār al-Kufr to Dār al-Islām. It serves as their adopted legal premise to take from the early life of the Prophet (peace be upon him) the Party's method of intellectual and political struggle culminating in seeking a military coup. On the other hand, if the Muslim world was Dār al-Islām then, according to the Party's stance, the appearance of Kufr would simply oblige armed insurrection directly against the rulers.

?Announcing war against him (the ruler) if clear disbelief (Kufr Buwah) is seen from him after he was ruling by Islām is obligatory and it is religiously forbidden (harām) to refrain from performing it.?14

?But the duty to raise arms against the ruler and to fight against him if he showed clear Kufr, this applies only if the land (Dār) is Dār al-Islām, and the rules of Islām were implemented and the ruler subsequently showed open Kufr.?15

Consequently, it is crucial for the Party to insist that Muslim lands are Dār al-Kufr. If they hypothetically accepted that Muslim lands are Dār al-Islām yet still coupled this with their insistence that the states are ruling by Kufr they would only give credence (by their own principles) to the Jihadist16 methodology of armed insurrection and assassinating the ruler.

Hizbut-Tahrir's inconsistency in enacting its Ijtihād that all Muslim lands are Dār al-Kufr

Hizbut-Tahrir use the theory I have outlined above to advocate the theological illegitimacy of contemporary Muslim regimes, and therefore the religious obligation on each and every Muslim to overthrow them17 in a pre-defined strategic order18. The flaw here, however, is astoundingly obvious for any trained practitioner of Shari'ah law yet amazingly, and despite being the view of today's Islamic jurists, has not yet been popularised. Perhaps that is due to no one fully understanding what it is that Hizbut-Tahrir actually believe.

If it can be demonstrated that the Party?s theory is nothing but a legal opinion (Ijtihād), then the argument that opposing views are based on Kufr becomes unsustainable. According to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Usūl al-Fiqh), and even according to the Party's own ideas, any legal opinion (Ijtihād) is by definition inconclusive (Zanni) and thus non-binding on those who follow opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt). Consequently, using an opinion (Ijtihād) to enforce a conclusion of Kufr upon others by force is a contradiction in terms within Islamic jurisprudence, not to mention Party ideology. At best it is Wahhabite, and at worst it is the cynical use of Islām to justify what is essentially a political ideology.

Principles elucidated within the Party's own culturing process via their adopted books hold that legal opinions (Ijtihādāt) are insufficient for producing judgements of religious deviancy (Bid'ah) against opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt), not to mention Kufr.

?...the strength of the evidence is only according to the one who educed (Mustadill) it. Even if the manner which he educed it was his own and the definition was his own, as long as he relied on the semblance of an evidence (Shubha al-Dalil). This is because how the strength of the evidence is perceived differs from people to people due to their disparate perceptions of the Shari'ah evidence itself and due to the manner which they understand the Arabic language and the Shari'ah.?19

This is, in fact, one of the main arguments Party followers advance against their Wahhabite agitators when defending themselves against the latter's accusations of religious unorthodoxy. The Party holds that its followers are obliged to condemn misconduct (Munkar), as defined by their interpretation, whether it be Bid?ah or Kufr. However, a misconduct (Munkar) can only occur if the perpetrator is not following an opposing jurist?s Ijtihād. If, however, they are following a jurist on a legal opinion (Ijtihād) then they are absolved of sin and no misconduct (Munkar) has occurred even if their action is contrary to the Party?s own view. Rather, the mistake of the jurist in his legal judgement still gains divine favour. The only time a view is not recognised is if it runs contrary to conclusive (Qati?i) injunctions, as is mentioned in Party books,

?The jurist (Mujtahid) exerts his utmost effort to derive the rule. If he is correct in his exertion (Ijtihād) then he has two rewards and if he makes a mistake he will have one....The Companions of the Prophet upon whom be peace (Sahābah) have formed a legally binding consensus (Ijmā') that the jurist (Mujtahid) is not accountable in the Shari'ah rules regarding speculative jurisprudence (Fiqhi) issues...That is why the Companions (Sahābah) disagreed on speculative issues but never on the definite (Qati'i) issues. Concerning speculative issues the jurist (Mujtahid) is correct in what he has arrived at by his legal exertion (Ijtihād) even if he is liable to make a mistake in his opinion. However, being correct does not mean that he has hit the target because this does not agree with the reality of a speculative rule since the Messenger (saw) considered him mistaken (Mukhti'). What is meant by saying that the jurist (Mujtahid) is right is in terms that do not rule out the possibility of making mistakes and not in terms of hitting the true target (Isāba) which is contrary to mistake. Describing someone who makes a mistake in legal exertion (Ijtihād) as right (Musib) is in the meaning that the text rewards [sic] the jurist (Mujtahid) even when he makes a mistake and not in the sense that he did not make a mistake. Therefore, every jurist (Mujtahid) is right according to what he thinks is right but this does not rule out the chance that a mistake could have been made.?20

Therefore, if it can be illustrated that a) the classifications of Dār al-Islām and Dār al-Kufr are not conclusive (Qati?i), and b) that classical jurists held opposing yet valid criteria for the definition of Dār al-Islām; then those criteria would suffice in forcing the Party to accept that Muslim lands are not conclusively Dār al-Kufr, but are only so in their subjective legal opinion (Ijtihād). Any subjective legal judgement would then be bound to recognise the validity of, though not agree with, the opposing view. As such, no Kufr would exist and no misconduct (Munkar) would have occurred to remove. Instead, a wrong, but valid and divinely praised legal opinion (Ijtihād) would exist in its place. Those who fully appreciate both Party and Islamic jurisprudential thinking will grasp the importance of the point here. If there is no misconduct (Munkar), but only a wrong yet legally valid opinion (Ijtihād), then according to Party ideology and Islamic jurisprudence, this Ijtihād is an Islamic opinion, and not Kufr. Thus, it is an Islamic opinion that Muslim lands are Dār al-Islām. It is also an Islamic opinion therefore, that Muslim lands hold theological legitimacy. Moreover, if the Party insists on not recognising opposing legal opinions (Ijtihādāt) on this matter then theirs is the theologically illegitimate stance. When two opposing Islamic opinions clash, both are bound to recognise, though not agree with, the validity of the other. Consequently, once the existence of an alternative view is substantiated, the Party is theologically bound to recognise the validity of Muslim lands being Dār al-Islām,

?This is because difference of opinion in deduction between the scholars does not make the rule legitimate before a Mujtahid and illegitimate before another. Rather it is a Shari?ah rule before all Muslims as long as there is (even) an obscure evidence (Shubha al-Dalil) from the Shar?iah evidences before the deducer of the rule, and it is possible according to the linguistic and Shari'ah knowledge (Ma?ārif) that one can deduce this type of deduction.?21

All that remains, therefore, is to demonstrate how Hizbut-Tahrir's judgement on Muslim lands being Dār al-Kufr is not Qati'i, but rather is an inconclusive legal reasoning (Ijtihād Zanni). Upon comprehending the significance of this point one can understand why the Party's second global leader, the late Sheikh Abdul Qadeem Zalloom22 insisted that this matter was closed to debate and absolutely decisive,

?The reality of Muslims today is sensed by every Muslim; it does not require any explanation nor does it necessitate any elaboration. Their lands are ruled by Kufr systems, thus they are conclusively (Qat'an) Dār al-Kufr [with no debate!].?23

.................CONTINUES...SEE LINK


05-09-2007, 21:52
Majid Nawaz is a nobody. He is a liitle tadpole in a big sea.

A sea which has many great scholars and visionaries.

05-09-2007, 22:11
Majid Nawaz is a nobody. He is a liitle tadpole in a big sea.

A sea which has many great scholars and visionaries.

Nobody suggested that he was "somebody"....He has an argument....which he appears to back with texts/evidences...

So let a discussion develop, a discussion free from useless feeble statements...

05-09-2007, 23:16
Majid Nawaz is a nobody. He is a liitle tadpole in a big sea.

A sea which has many great scholars and visionaries.

Nobody suggested that he was "somebody"....He has an argument....which he appears to back with texts/evidences...

So let a discussion develop, a discussion free from useless feeble statements...

If you want to discuss then please feel free to discuss.

06-09-2007, 00:28
Bearing in mind that Nawaz was from their leadership committe in the UK, in attempting to claim that the Muslim lands are Dar al-Islam and that the APostate rulers are legitimate Islimc rulers with the right to adopt the kufr laws they do, shows that the Zaloom group either:

1. Has been heavily infiltrated


2. The level of horrific decline which leads their members to hold such declined views.

Both of which which further prove the need of the redress in 1997 in order to preserve the party and cleanse it from both.

This is his conclusion:

"It cannot be said here (though no doubt it will be) that rulers of today are not the true leaders because they rule in Dar al-Kufr and thus they have no authority to adopt on matters of legal difference (Ikhtilaf Shari'i).

This cannot be said because it concerns the very topic of debate (Muhall al-Nizā') and is consequently a circular argument. If the very topic itself is subject to a valid dispute then it can only fall to the leader to adopt and thus agreement with the ruler is irrelevant as long as he adopts an Islamic opinion. Moreover, it cannot be asserted that this principle is specific to the Caliph because the maxim in Arabic actually uses the word leader (Imām) and furthermore, the Party considers that the name is interchangeable between Caliph (Khalifah), leader (Imām), President (Ra'is) Prince (Amir), Sultan or anything else that denotes such an authority.64 Consequently, the matter revolves around whether the existent rulers are the authority within Dār al-Islām, and that is the very subject matter that is differed over and is being adopted upon. Consequently, one can believe that the Party's opinion is the strongest Islamic legal opinion (hukm Shari'i), however since those in authority do not hold that opinion, but are on another Islamic opinion, all are bound to follow the leader's adoption. This is because 'the opinion of the leader (Imām) settles disputes' (according to the Party's own thoughts). In this way one can still believe the Party opinion to be the strongest legally, yet is bound not to act on it because the contrary opinion is adopted by the ruler."

06-09-2007, 19:38
... in attempting to claim that the Muslim lands are Dar al-Islam and that the APostate rulers are legitimate Islimc rulers with the right to adopt the kufr laws they do...

"Apostate Rulers", abujamal?

What must we do with an Apostate-Kafir usurping the rule and occupying our lands?

What about if an army were to militarily back (ally with...) the Apostate, what happens to them???

Please explain...

06-09-2007, 22:40
to the leader to adopt and thus agreement with the ruler is irrelevant as long as he adopts an Islamic opinion. Moreover, it cannot be asserted that this principle is specific to the Caliph because the maxim in Arabic actually uses the word leader (Imām) and furthermore, the Party considers that the name is interchangeable between Caliph (Khalifah), leader (Imām), President (Ra'is) Prince (Amir), Sultan or anything else that denotes such an authority.

This quote of his further highlights the terrible decline of the zaloom group where someone from their leadership committe fails to understand (if it was not a deliberate attempt at of subversion) that the issue is related to what the Islamic head of State is called but does not apply to the head of a republic or Kingdom in which kufr is being implemented.

07-09-2007, 10:09
"if it was not a deliberate attempt at subversion" - surely Nawaz's close relaionship with Eddy Husain are not a coincidence. EH acknowledged MN in his book and again in his article in the Guardian on Wednesday this week. This is in line with the Rand proposals for supporting non Arab sufi types who are compliant with the prevailing world order. Nawaz is attempting a fiqhi justification for this compliance.

07-09-2007, 18:03
also in line with the rand report about presenting their twisted ideas as a matter of opinion based on "their" understanding of the texts, which should be tolerated like all other opinions. Insha allah they are doomed for failure as already appears the case. the likes of ED Hussain and this nawaz character, jumping too an idea which completely contradicts the opinion they carried the day before does raise some serious question marks about these guys.

08-09-2007, 01:38
London based Majid Nawaz formally Jailed in Egypt
Ed Hussain writer
Rashad Ali Bangali background from Sheffied and now living in London

They consider the current systems to be acceptable

They argue that Libya, Egypt, syria etc all implement Islam and there is nothign wrong with the laws there

Is this view possible in Islam?

08-09-2007, 16:04
London based Majid Nawaz formally Jailed in Egypt
Ed Hussain writer
Rashad Ali Bangali background from Sheffied and now living in London

They consider the current systems to be acceptable

They argue that Libya, Egypt, syria etc all implement Islam and there is nothign wrong with the laws there

Is this view possible in Islam?

Impossible. Besides, it looks like Ed Hussain has left Islam by converting to Secularism any way:
?Religions are not for governments or states, they are for individuals. The state can assist individuals religious responsibilities, but governments cannot, should not, profess faith? (Hussain, The Islamist)

08-09-2007, 19:17
to the leader to adopt and thus agreement with the ruler is irrelevant as long as he adopts an Islamic opinion. Moreover, it cannot be asserted that this principle is specific to the Caliph because the maxim in Arabic actually uses the word leader (Imām) and furthermore, the Party considers that the name is interchangeable between Caliph (Khalifah), leader (Imām), President (Ra'is) Prince (Amir), Sultan or anything else that denotes such an authority.

This quote of his further highlights the terrible decline of the zaloom group where someone from their leadership committe fails to understand (if it was not a deliberate attempt at of subversion) that the issue is related to what the Islamic head of State is called but does not apply to the head of a republic or Kingdom in which kufr is being implemented.

If Muslims just understand the clear-cut unabrogated principle, that a Muslim in Authority must Rule by Islam exclusively. Then we would not be in this mess, neither would we need to argue over the terminological use of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, or whether the Muslim in Authority calls himself Caliph, Imam, President, King etc.

It is the deviation from the principle that a Muslim must Rule according to Islam BY DEFAULT - that is the root cause of the problem. Both HTs' and Majid are guility of neglecting this.

The matter is simple - a Muslim must legislate according to Islam, if he does not then we deal with him accordingly.

All these other stances just make it easier for the Rulers to deviate and commit Kufr Buwah. Such groups facilitate this incorrect process to varying degrees, where as it should not be allowed to any degree.

12-09-2007, 14:53
The guy was on Newsnight last night.

Its amazing how someone can just do a U-turn on the Islamic position on basic thoughts and is it a coincidence that nawaaz, Shiraz maher and Ed Hussain have all "come-out" in this co-ordinated way?

He says these are the things he propagated and now regrets:

Muslim first, not British
"Suicide Bombings" justified
Israel must be abolished
Participating in Democratic system Haram

Disagrees with putting "religion and politics at same level"

Watch it here http://news.bbc.co.uk/player/nol/newsid_6990000/newsid_6990400/6990455.stm?bw=bb&mp=rm&news=1

13-09-2007, 16:45
Jazakallah khayr for showing that link I found it shocking. I had heard a few years ago that he was in prison in Egypt and being tortured and even back then my hunch was that such circumstances could force him to eventually leave and publicly disown the organisation. Everything that he said on there was wrong but I wouldn't dismiss the possibility of coercion. I didn't know him but I knew his wife and how incredibly staunch and passionate she was about "the dawah". One thing that stood out in that newsnight footage was how they kept showing him standing with his mother, an uncovered woman who he says himself taught him 'liberal' values and his wife is not on there at all. I wonder if either Rabia refused to participate or whether he would've found it embarrassing to express a whole load of apologist Kufr opinions with a fully covered woman by his side?

14-09-2007, 00:45
HTUK have really messed up here. First it was with the redress , then came Parliament, then Ed Hussain ( who was being groomed to be a HTUK leader) and now Majid Nawaz( who also was being groomed to be a HTUK leader).

Who is next ?

HTUK have to take blame for this. Majid Nawaz is a product of HTUK.

It is quite annoying that HTUK are now slandering him, instead of saying "we messed up, we got it wrong" they are to arrogant to admit this.
So they start using spin.

When HTUK had the opportunity to make a comment on newsnight all they could come up with was about opinion polls.

What cowards at least they could have said something construtive or perhaps it did not suit their image and they did not want to offend their kaffir friends.

14-09-2007, 12:56
HTUK have to take blame for this. Majid Nawaz is a product of HTUK.

It is quite annoying that HTUK are now slandering him, instead of saying "we messed up, we got it wrong" they are to arrogant to admit this.

HT itself is responsible for the whole thing. All these problems even before 1997 are stemmed from HT itself.

HT has the seeds of its' own self-destruction within itself.

As for saying "we messed up, we got it wrong" this needs to be acknowledged by all HTs with regards to its Aqeedah, Thought and Method - starting from when HT was formed. You guys need a Radical Overhaul or just dissolve the party and start from scratch.

HT just needs to wake up to the fact that Nabhani got it wrong.

I say this in all sincerity without arrogance, during this blessed month.

For Allahs' Sake at least in this one month think outside the HT Box.

14-09-2007, 13:16
HTUK have to take blame for this. Majid Nawaz is a product of HTUK.

It is quite annoying that HTUK are now slandering him, instead of saying "we messed up, we got it wrong" they are to arrogant to admit this.

HT itself is responsible for the whole thing. All these problems even before 1997 are stemmed from HT itself.

HT has the seeds of its' own self-destruction within itself.

As for saying "we messed up, we got it wrong" this needs to be acknowledged by all HTs with regards to its Aqeedah, Thought and Method - starting from when HT was formed. You guys need a Radical Overhaul or just dissolve the party and start from scratch.

HT just needs to wake up to the fact that Nabhani got it wrong.

I say this in all sincerity without arrogance, during this blessed month.

For Allahs' Sake at least in this one month think outside the HT Box.

Funny how you have failed in EVERY thread to show where "Nabhani git it wrong". But you keep us ammused. So continue to keep the hits up on this site which now appears very high in search engines for Hizb ut Tahrir.

Always with sincerity, not just because its ramadhan.

For Allahs' Sake at least in this one month think outside the ant-HT Box.

14-09-2007, 18:21
Some people will attack Hizb ut Tahrir on almost anything, even though this Party puts Islam and the interests of the Ummah first. And they defend any rubbish that gets released by others. This is not only on this forum but even happens in our communities. look at some of the others threads on this forum for example, people defending OBL and "Al-Qaeda" like there is no tomorrow, even though actions of such groups clearly benefits the Kuffar more then the Ummah.

As for Mr Majid Nawaz, and others like him, they have sold their Islam for a cheap price of this world. I wonder how many more like them still working within the Zaloom Faction?

14-09-2007, 22:26
If you see a correction as an attack then you have a problem.

14-09-2007, 22:42
Funny how you have failed in EVERY thread to show where "Nabhani git it wrong". But you keep us ammused. So continue to keep the hits up on this site which now appears very high in search engines for Hizb ut Tahrir.

Always with sincerity, not just because its ramadhan.

For Allahs' Sake at least in this one month think outside the ant-HT Box.

I did not fail in every thread, you guys brush everything under the carpet in every thread.

When all the arguments are presented with the Qur'an and Sunnah...

...your refutation is one-liners and personal attacks in big blue print.

15-09-2007, 22:07
He did not appose HT in the Newsnight interview.

He opposed Islam. He opposed the liberation of Muslim land by attacking the idea that Israel should be removed and attacked the implementation of Islam in the societal affairs of the Muslims and defended democratic turkey! The biggest shame is that he lied about being consistent with traditional Islam. Which one are is he referring to, the ?Ismaeeli traditional Islam??

This is not surprising since Ed Hussain whose book you helped put together became a Murtad by the following statement:

?Religions are not for governments or states, they are for individuals. The state can assist individuals religious responsibilities, but governments cannot, should not, profess faith?.

Many traitors have been recruited to divert the Muslims but Alhamdullah the call for Islam is growing and nothing he or other traitors such as ED Hussain, Rashad Ali etc do will halt the progress of Islam.

Now that he has re-evaluated your position, he can now revert to his girl friends and his pre-agnostic state, one that he so proudly expounded on Newsnight.

Finally, I am sure the state of Israel and mosad will be in touch with him in the near future given his supportive statements about Israel.

16-09-2007, 02:42
Salam alaikom w rahmatu allah

The Haq (the idea) leads men, not vice versa.

no muslim will accept what Nawaz is saying, and believe me no one claims that he is a dawah carrier can say it openly in the muslim lands, its even very difficult now for the authorty's Shiekhs, The muslims are looking for unity, I watched the interview on bbc web site with Nawaz, and said alhamdulillah this man exposed himself, very weak understanding.

?Read with me this ayah, its about some people, they are not ruling by kufer, they are just saying to the one who will rull by Kufer, that they will listen (obey) not in every thing, just in few things.

and please go back to the ayates to find out the punishment they will receive, so what is going to happen to the one who will rull by kufer.

I cant beleive any one read this ayah and say yes for gradualism or any type of ruling but Khilafah system.

??? ????? ????? ????? ????? ?? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ??? ????? ????? ???? ???????

((That is because they said to those who hate what Allah has sent down, 'we shall obey you in one matter', and Allah knows their secrets))).

The hizb went through alot of hardships and alhamdulilah, came out very strong, This is Allah's Daweh and Allah will protect it.

Oh allah guide your slave Atta bin khaleel abu rashtah, allahoma ammen

16-09-2007, 02:54
Ameeeeeeeen to that!


16-09-2007, 03:54
brother what is the referance for this Ayah

16-09-2007, 04:03
brother what is the referance for this Ayah

Yes Akhi we are in the month of Quraan, bark allah fek, and its Surah Alqetal (Surah Muhammed 47).


16-09-2007, 19:15
47:26 This, because they said to those who hate what Allah has revealed, "We will obey you in part of (this) matter"; but Allah knows their (inner) secrets.

Surah Muhammed verse 26 (Yusuf Ali translation).

19-09-2007, 16:14
Asalaam alaikum
I saw the BBC clip of the Nawaz interview. His story is rather sad. What did they do to him in that prison for 4 years? I am inclined to find some excuse that perhaps he was seriously affected by his imprisonment. Or indeed, perhaps the Egyptian govt threatened him and his family with intel which made it percieve that the Egyptian services could reach him and the others there in Britain.

In any case, his claim that the Hizb is cultlike is idiotic. Halaqa have always welcomed participants to bring alternative viewpoints and study Islamic scholarship as well survey nonMuslim ideas. That is the idea of enlightenment nurtured: expand one's knowledge and intellectual scope. If he retarded his own personal development, that is definitely his own fault. The Party may be partially negligent in that it failed to have a sufficient personal psyche profile of certain members and to ascertain their weaknesses and shortcomings, such as a lack of knowledge about Islam from alternative sources.

If MN would objectively explore the plethora of Islamic scholars addressing pertinent matters, he'd be able to determine that IMAM An Nabhani (rha) was a genius in intellect and a mujaddid in the deen. His scholarship is monumental. Even the most hardened critics have caved to the excellent caliber of his scholarship. Even I've heard takfiri Salafis, after studying some of his works like the Draft Constitution, wonder if he and the Party are what is referred to in the Prophet (saaw)'s prophetic hadith that (paraphrased) the saving/leading of the Ummah back to the deen will come from the people around Al Quds/Sham. Even nonMuslims acknowledge the genius of An Nabhani (rha).

But as is the case with enlightened thinkers, shallow or retarded thinkers fall away from them eventually. How many people own a computer but are illiterate in computer programming or even word processing?

19-09-2007, 16:42
As for the matter of MN argument that the basis of the concept of Dar ul Islam/Kufr is thanny and therefore the alternative interpretation is valid though wrong, is indeed in conflict with the actual matter, or muhalla niza`. the matter is:
do the Muslim governments rule by Islam?
The qati` evidence renders NOT ruling by Islam as without a doubt kufr, thulm, fasq.
And the governments do indeed fail to rule by Islam.
And they have been repeated informed and instructed on their failures without them altering their ruling. Thus, the matter is a certitude and reality. (Perhaps MN has suffered so during his imprisonment that it is difficult for him to distinguish reality from imagination).

As for the use of the concept of Darul Islam/Kufr, it could be included as secondary and explanatory of the reality of the matter. Nonetheless, it does not alter the certitude of the reality.


As well, the Party abstains from ruling and governance even during the khilafah. The actual policies of a khilafah state towards the Muslim world not yet united under him are those of the khalifah and the amirul jihad. Military action or diplomacy through intellectual/political propagation are the choices of the amir as in any state. And if the khalif is an astute student of the Prophet (saaw)'s political genius, he would seek ways to bring the people to him with the least amount of bloodshed and the greatest amount of mercy.

In contrast, MN failed to mention how the Muslim regimes are the bloodthirsty devils of the earth. Algeria, Syria, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Iraq, and so on all demostrate their terrible deeds and to what measures they will take to stay in power. And with the backings of the West, who have the blood of millions on their hands, it is they who are prepared to kill millions.

I am inclined to write the Newsnigh producers in response to that interview. Anyone else?

22-09-2007, 01:29
This is really Mashallah very good...


1. Introduction

The Muslim world is in a state of political flux, with decades of mismanagement, repression and political stagnation being opposed by more assertive populations and political movements. The US has responded to these changes by calling for greater freedom and democratic reforms. These calls, along with the failed military interventions, have catalysed the unprecedented vocalisation for the implementation of the sharia, unification of the Muslim lands and resistance to western cultural, military and political hegemony in the Muslim world, encapsulated in the call for the Caliphate[1]. The vanguard of change is led by the Islamicists, from Morocco to Indonesia, emboldened by an ideological interpretation of the Islamic faith by a leading number of twentieth century thinkers and writers[2]. Increasingly at the forefront of these movements is Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), an international Islamic political party, with its call for a world-wide Caliphate.

Attempts by Western governments at containment and oppression have failed to date leading to considerations of engagement with the Islamists, always however on one premise, as stated by the former British Home Minister Charles Clarke in 2005, ??there can be no negotiation about the re-creation of the Caliphate; there can be no negotiation about the imposition of Sharia (Islamic) law?[3]. The focus on engagement is now focusing on the refutation of Islamist ideas in an attempt to diffuse the increasingly vehement calls for change.

The UK has seen an increase in Islamic activism over recent years, fuelled by unethical government foreign policy. The government has responded with a number of initiatives to combat this providing funding for the training of local leaders (imams, chaplains etc), Islamic websites, road shows and informers. Terrorism legislation has been introduced reducing civil rights and introducing heavy sentences for those ?advocating? or ?glorifying? terrorism[4]. Collaboration has begun in earnest with academics, scholars and ex-Islamists through engagement and refutation of Islamic political ideas[5]. The interest in ex-members of these movements, including Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher and Hassan Butt[6], especially by the intelligence community, provides the context and background for this critique.

Maajid Nawaz, an ex-member of HT, recently announced his resignation of the party and following his predecessors, has began publicly challenging the ideas of HT, with the first of his series of announced articles comprising ?Evaluating Hizbut-Tahrir's Theo-Political Stance?[7]. This paper is a detailed response to these challenges.

2. What is the Argument?

Maajid introduces his article by saying, ?I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis, ...merely to serve narrow political agendas?, a theme that is central to his new enterprise.

His article continues to argue that HT through a "political ijtihad" creates a theory whereby non-decisive definitions of the terms Dar al-Kufr (lands of non-Islam) are adopted and applied to the current Muslim lands, to ?advocate the theological illegitimacy of contemporary Muslim regimes?[8]. The argument then proceeds to demand the current systems/regimes need to be transformed into the Caliphate (Islamic system of governance) and forcefully merged into a unitary state through HT?s Islamic methodology. Majid contends there is a difference of opinion (ijtihad) on these definitions amongst classical jurists, and as such, HT cannot (Islamically) enforce its view on anyone else and must obey the current rulers whose view is final on the matter due to them being legitimate. He says, "If it can be demonstrated that the Party?s theory is nothing but a legal opinion (Ijtih?d), then the argument that opposing views are based on Kufr becomes unsustainable."[9]

He further states he will demonstrate how the party's own theological, intellectual and legal principles when applied to their "political conclusions" result in the invalidity of the HT stance. He maintains HT even acknowledges these are contested ideas but at the same time rejects the alternative views and acts as if the position is definitive. As such, in his view, HT?s position is contradictory and invalid.

His article centres on proving the following three points:
? The non-scriptural and contested nature of the technical terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam
? The indecisive nature of scriptural citations used to arrive at them
? The acknowledgement in an adopted HT book that the scholars differed in their views as to how Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr

3. Issues with the Argument

There are a number of problems with Maajid?s article. These are summarised below and addressed in this paper:
a) Assuming an Islamic counter-reformation and political reformation are mutually exclusive
b) Assuming usage of indecisive technical terminology cannot be used to describe decisive concepts
c) Believing decisive concepts (implementation of the Islamic creed in political life) are contested
d) Misquoting and misrepresenting the classical scholars
e) Misrepresentation of HT?s adoptions and analysis
f) Concealment of an underlying political agenda

4. The Modern Muslim World - Dar al-Islam (Lands of Islam)?

Maajid?s crusade against HT in particular, and Islamists in general, is premised on the fact that HT has somehow politicised Islam; HT misunderstands the governance of the Muslim world (which happens to be Islamic, similar to the Caliphates of the past) and through its call for a Caliphate is causing and the cause of the West?s antagonism towards Islam. Furthermore he believes that a counter-reformation and political reformation and mutually exclusive with the latter being unneccessary. He states, ?I impress upon all people that Islām today is not in need of a politically inspired modernist reformation, which is actually the cause of our current crisis?.

For an ex-member of a political party, he presents an unusually simplistic understanding of the complex causes of decline and flux in the Muslim world, its historic relationship with the West (colonial Europe) and the current crisis it faces. Jean-Fran?ois Mayer, in his earlier cited paper, states, ?Reading Hizb ut-Tahrir's literature could indeed fuel resentment against the West, since the latter is constantly presented as oppressing the Muslim world and conspiring against it. One should add that here Hizb ut-Tahrir only builds on feelings that are already widespread in Muslim communities (including communities established in the West)?[10].

How did these feelings and the politicisation of Islam become so entrenched in Muslims globally? The answer to this lies in the experiences of the Muslim world during the European colonialist period, eventually becoming institutionalised at all levels. This is a vast subject beyond the scope of a paper such as this. However an overview highlighting some of the exogenous influences on the politics, society and governance of the Muslim world will be sufficient to demonstrate this. Furthermore it highlights the error in assuming the Muslim world continues in its historical trajectory and that HT and present day Islamists are politicising Islam for their own political ends.

Colonialism had a major role and influence in shaping the institutional foundations and parameters of the politics of the postcolonial states. Having ruthlessly replaced centuries old institutions, traditions and structures in the Muslim world, the colonising powers disrupted a historic continuum creating fault lines and tensions that reverberate today. Independence ended the sovereignty of European powers over their territories; however it did not produce states afresh. Despite the rhetoric of planting of new seeds, the new states were nothing more than new branches based on a trunk that was planted during the colonial days.

Colonial institutions, policies and attitudes towards governance determined the trajectory of the post-colonial nation states, developing in the European intellectual, legal and cultural legacy. The machinery of the colonial state was inherited and to varying degrees the model of the colonial state was followed with ideological continuities easily visible despite the rhetoric of the new leaders. The preponderance of colonial power ensured that all discourse be both hegemonic over and repressive of the Islamic world. It was not a dialogue between equals nor a conversation, but an attempt to reconstitute Islam and Muslims both at the level of consciousness and at the social level. The impact of this historical experience is not difficult to discern and has been highlighted by numerous researchers.

Nation States
The colonization of Muslim lands started with India, the scramble for Africa and the division of Ottoman lands following the First World War. The era ended after the Second World War when Britain and France withdrew from most of the majority of their territories. Islam received harsh criticism from the colonialists and their scholars instilling a sense of inferiority in the local elites and rising bureaucrats including even those who opposed colonialism.
Colonial territories made little effort to unify their peoples to create national societies or national cultures. Their focus was in defending their territories against other colonial powers or reducing the burden of ruling. The former led them to promoting the sanctity of their boundaries which led to the permanent borders and divisions visible today. The latter prevented the creation of lasting identities seen in the diverseness and tensions in states including Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia and Nigeria.
The deliberate manipulation of diversities to strengthen their rule created increasingly fractured societies. Along with poorly thought out border definitions meant that tensions and wars were inevitable. Civil wars in Sudan, Iraq, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kenya and Tanzania and Chad are but a few. Territory disputes included Morocco, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Syria, Lebanon Palestine, Malaysia and Singapore.

The colonizers encouraged and invested in education and educational institutions to educate those who would eventually run the machinery of colonialism. Over time they influenced generations of Muslim leaders and intellectual developments in the Muslim lands. Famous institutions included University of Punjab, University of Malaya, and Atchison College in Lahore[11]. Many sons of the elite were sent to schools in Eton Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge in England or in Paris and Amsterdam. Muhammad Iqbal studied at Cambridge and Heidelberg Universities as well as Lincoln?s Inn where Jinnah received his law degree. Many of the North African liberation movement leaders were students in North African French schools and Paris Universities.
Amongst the militaries officers would be trained at places such as Sandhurst and Saint Cyr or officer schools modelled on their European counter parts such as Quetta Staff College in Pakistan.
The pervasive impact of education introduced the Muslim world to western literature and philosophy. Figures such as J S Mill and Rousseau and over time, Sartre and Camus, became models for dissenting intellectuals just as Lenin, Castro, Mao and Che Guevara captured the imagination of activists[12].

State Institutions
The colonialists generally focused on domination to ensure legitimacy and security. Institutions were devised to organise relations between the state and society and the paradigm that governs politics, maintained in the workings of successor states. The colonial state was highly centralised utilising institutions with a European flavour; the police, judiciary, military and bureaucracy being key repositories of its authority. The institutions were not designed for society ? for instance, the bureaucracy was designed not to maintain order but to ensure the smooth running of government and economy.
This structure allowed a European minority to rule vast territories, managing the economic flow of resources and goods between the parent state and its territories. These institutions, embedded in subsequent states determined the basis of the state, its character and its relationship with society and other states. States such as Pakistan replicated the colonial state in set up and function as well as how they envision their own roles, with Jinnah the first governor-general and the India Act of 1935 being law of the land until 1956.

Military and Police Forces
The military, intelligence and police forces were trained to provide support to their colonial masters. The training ensured soldiers, and more importantly the officer corp., internalized the military ideas and political values of the colonial administration, resulting in an over-preoccupation with order and impatience with politics of the masses[13]. Militaries were trained for external war but for preservation of internal order, giving them a perceived right to interfere in politics to restore order. The size of the militaries was usually based on the interests of the colonisers and Muslim states inherited omnipotent militaries, too large for their population sizes and economic strengths. The colonial policy of recruiting amongst minorities was due to them being more closely allied with the colonial order and their willingness to help suppress the dominant community as well as being less likely to respond to religious calls like Jihad. The legacy of the Great Mutiny of 1857 shaped thinking resulting in Alawis dominating the Syrian army and Punjabis in the Pakistani army.
The forces having fought with their senior colonial officers up to independence developed and institutionalised attitudes of mistrust and cynicism of those who fought for independence. Indonesian generals remained wary of Sukarno, removing him when they were provided with the pretext of Communism and the same may be said of those who lead coups in Bangladesh, Nigeria and Sudan. Even the left-leaning junior officers who overthrew their senior officers of the old school to join the anti-imperialist struggles did not resolve the tensions between military and civilian orders, leading to military takeovers in Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

Like the military, the bureaucracy was moulded in the ethos of colonial culture, sharing the same political outlook as their European rulers. Due to their power over the state machinery, politicians would have little control over them lest they disrupt the workings of state. As such, they had major input into state formation, ensuring continuities in the ethos and mode of operation of the state before and after independence. In Pakistan the bureaucracy eclipsed the political elite in managing the country, replacing Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan after 1951 by senior bureaucrats Ghulam Muhammad and Iskandar Mirza, both having risen through the bureaucracy under the British.
The quality of the bureaucracy was generally determined by the investment the colonial power made in its administration, the Indian Civil Service being exemplary, whilst the bureaucracies of the Arab Near East and Libya being underdeveloped. Over time, many lost their independence and their pre-eminence declined resulting in the diminishment of their political role and contribution to socioeconomic change.

The British colonies generally had a system of justice modelled after that of Britain, with some degree of autonomy, its independence from the executive branch becoming embedded in the structure of the postcolonial state. As such, colonial subjects usually had a strong degree of respect for it. In Pakistan, the judiciary has regularly defied the executive branch; with examples including opposition to Ayub Khan?s banning of Jamaati Islam in 1964, ruling against Ghulam Khan?s dismissing of the government in 1993 and most recently the stand-off against Musharraf. The Malaysian judiciary has a similar history[14] as do most post-colonial British territories.
The judiciary had the interesting effect of instituting particular patterns of political activity in the body politic of the pre and post-colonial society, allowing courts to become avenues for political activism.

Governance - Politics of Identity
Colonial rule was often only possible through the manipulation of divisions in society, ethnic, linguistic and religious[15]. By accentuating social differences, they institutionalised them; treating communities differently in the eyes of the law, at polling booths, in how resources were allocated and in recognition of religious rights etc. This encouraged the politics of identity at the cost of development of uniform civil societies. In India, this resulted in the emergence of the All-India Muslim League in 1906 that lobbied for separate electorates for Muslims and Hindus with similar reactions in Malaysia, Nigeria and Palestine.
In essence elections in colonial rule provided a critical political framework that shaped the conception of communities of their relation to power at the centre as well as their own identity and self-definition. The subsequent state leaders (usually from the colonial military or bureaucracy), would continue manipulating social divisions even as they spoke of national unity - Iraq being a case in question.
The importance of certain geographic locations to colonising powers (e.g., North West India to the British for supply of troops) or where the colonisers arrived late (e.g., the French agricultural relationships with Syria) meant that they developed patronage networks, which have left indelible marks in future state-society relationships. The state emerged as paternalistic and society came to see patronage as a function of state (this contributed to Malays remaining aloof from commercial activities expecting the state to guarantee economic and social standing).

Though the aim and general structure of colonial authority was usually similar, variations of how the colonial administrators ruled their vassal populations accounted for the different experiences in state formations post-colonialism. In Algeria and Libya colonial rule was direct while in Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia, Java and India local elites were used. The Dutch in Java, utilised the local elites to resolve labour shortages, entrenching their socipolitical positions, creating dependencies between the peasantry and elite (the Dutch permitting exploitation and impoverishment for their own ends). The British carefully controlled 250 princes in India to control a third of the Indian population ? they controlled the rest of the population by manipulating landowners, local chiefs and grandees[16]. Symbiotic relationships resulted, entrenching the positions of these local elites, who favoured compartmentalisation of policy in favour of a uniform national political arena. This allowed them to control segments of the polity and negotiate with the centre. In Pakistan this trend is still visible today with the landowning class wielding significant power, controlling politics at all levels, and resisting land reforms. The power of the monarchy in the Gulf States and Brunei and the characteristics of tribal chiefs in East Africa and Nigeria is reflective of these British policies. The Algerian experience with direct French rule to ensure integration into France and exploitation through commercial gain for their settlers resulted in centralised rule ? local elites and leaders were seen with hostility, a reflection of the post-colonial Algerian landscape.[17]

Its structural expressions in the Islamic environment continue to reproduce themselves in a fashion that perpetuates this power relationship. Elites in most Islamic countries are largely products of superimposed constitutive educational and political structures. In this lies the essence of the polarization and bifurcation between elites and masses in the Muslim world. Muslim and Arab intellectuals, imbued with the Western discourse of rationality, entered political life as natural allies to the local traditional elites and the colonial West. The broad mass base, on the other hand, had no choice but to fall back upon the traditional values of their own society to protect themselves from the excesses of the new class - a class which sought and seeks to pattern its life and values along Western lines. Commitment to traditional (Islamic) values thus reflects a defensive posture aimed at rejuvenating the spirit of internal cohesion and self-identification against the disintegrative effects brought in by patterns of modern life.

In the absence of social cohesion, it becomes almost impossible for the State to deal adequately with strains, penetrate society, regulate social relationships and extract resources. In the absence of an overarching consciousness that unites and merges its subjects at all levels of the social scale in a commonly accepted meaning and criteria of validity, there can be neither strong societies nor strong states

HT go to some lengths to detail the reality of the colonial division of the Ottoman state, introduction of foreign creeds, the installation of agents and groomed elites, and the removal of Islam from politics and societal life leaving at best remnants intact (usually to pacify the masses/ullema), with control over succession of power to those who would perpetuate their interests and hegemony. The institutionalization of secularism and the proactive marginalization of Islamic thoughts/institutions from political life have been resisted by societies in each and every Muslim country[18]. A review of scholarly writings that address the 20th century colonialist experience across the Muslim world and the response of the Muslim intellectuals speak for themselves and need no elaboration as per Abdul Qadeem Zalloom's quote Maajid refers to.

Against this complex, multi-dimensional, historically evolving reality, Maajid?s analysis is little more than a parochial one-dimensional view of the situation. His view the current regimes as being simply "Muslims" does not take into consideration the institutionalized colonial values, foreign ideologies, systems, agendas and outlooks, visible today across the organs of the modern states, their constitutions, policies, administration and organizations along with the resulting tensions. As such, his conclusions are fundamentally flawed.

5. Decisive Texts are Indecisive?

HT?s discourse is concerned with the implementation of non-Islamic systems across the Muslim world since the division of the Ottoman state by colonial powers, a situation unparalleled in Muslim history. This situation is sensed and understood by all Muslims, thinkers, politicians, movements and the masses ? as such it is a decisive and categorical reality which HT term as non-Islamic, and one that is acknowledged by all as needing change.

To understand HT?s argument, that the implementation of non-Islamic creeds in Muslim lands is decisively and categorically prohibited and utilisation of any other ideology or system is kufr (non-Islamic), the notion of certainty must be addressed.

There are a number of discussions in philosophy that attempt to argue a relativist position on matters of epistemology[19]. Although the oft-quoted view in Western Philosophy is that the quest for certainty is a failed enterprise, this is primarily due to an erroneous attempt at defining certainty to unnecessarily exclude scepticism[20]. However, without this requirement, the term is definable and arguable. Certainty comprises the state of an individual (or a society) on a matter where there is no realistic doubt. This is supported by the usage of this term (yaqin) by Allah (swt) in a number of verses[21] supporting the existence and necessity of the notion of certainty[22].

Maajid has worked on a flawed assumption, namely, if some people (or scholars) disagree on a matter it is zanni (indecisive). This is incorrect as certainty can be gained despite the existence of people disputing an issue, as in cases of religious certainty. More so, as disagreement exists on every matter, even those that all Muslims would acknowledge as definite and decisive, (existence of God, Quran being the word of God, Islam being the truth (haqq), obligation of prayer (salat) etc ) would that mean there is no such thing as certainty?

The existence of a disagreement is not important and does not mean the matter is certain or uncertain - the substance of the disagreement must be evaluated to determine if it is a valid disagreement. This understanding is acknowledged by HT as per Maajid?s quotation from ?Shaksiyyah Islamiyya (The Islamic Personality)? in relation to shubhat al-daleel (semblance of evidence) for determining the validity of an alternative view. However the associated conditions are as follows, without which there is no shubhat al-daleel[23]:
a) Definite general evidences comprise Quran, Sunnah, Ijma al-Sahabah and Qiyas.
b) Speculative general evidences include: istihsan (juristic preference), al-masalih al mursala (unqualified interests) etc.
c) The angle of deductive reasoning (istidlal) regarding these evidences must have been on studies of the Arabic language and studies of sections of the Quran and Sunnah.

For example, a Quranic verse states: ?Cut the hand of the thief, male or female?[24]. It may be said the cutting is to prevent him from stealing and this may be done through any means, e.g., imprisonment, exhortation etc. Or it may be said the word ?qata?a? (to cut) is an ambivalent term (lafz al-mujmal) meaning either separating the limb (amputation) or scarring and both cases are allowed. However, neither view has a shubhat al-daleel. This is because the deductive reasoning in this manner does not accord with the Arabic language or other divine texts. Linguistically, one does not use the metaphorical meaning (majazi) except when the real meaning is impossible. The ambivalent meaning has been transformed into a fixed meaning by the explanation of texts and one does not refer to a meaning contradicting it. Abu Hurairah (ra) narrated a thief who had stolen a turban was brought to the Messenger who ordered his hand be cut and the wound be sealed by boiling oil. Subsequent Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar, followed this understanding without any objection from any of the companions. Punishing the thief with anything other than cutting of the hand has no evidence or semblance of evidence[25].

Furthermore, shubhat daleel does not mean one does not follow in action the opinion one has come to. Respect for shubhat daleel in terms of recognising it as an Islamic opinion is a general principle and traditional principle[26]. As for respect in actions, this is an ikhtilafi (disputed) matter and depends on the particular hukm (rule) at hand. In some issues one does not impose one?s opinion and in others one does. Therefore to state shubhat daleel means respect in all actions is a misrepresentation of HT?s and the traditional understanding of shubhat daleel.

To demonstrate this some fiqh examples are given below:
If someone abandons prayer he is a kafir according to Hanbalis but a sinful Muslim for the rest. Everyone respects this opinion but in action one would pray behind this man and consider giving a daughter in marriage to him, but the Hanbali would not as for him he is kafir. So the different views of the depiction of a reality command respect as Islamic opinions but not necessarily respect in actions such one abandons an opinion and follows the other opinion.
a) If a Shafii combines his salah (prayer), the Hanafi would respect this as an Islamic opinion but not follow him in his action.
b) If a man pronounces divorce three times in one sitting and he follows that it is irrevocable, it does not matter what opinion the woman follows. The opinion of the woman that 3 in one sitting is not valid does not mean respect of her opinion.
c) If a ruler usurps authority and he follows that this is allowed. People who follow the opinion that mutasallit has to be removed are entitled to fight even though the ruler follows a different opinion. For example those who historically fought Yazid and Hajjaj bin Yusuf.
d) If a wali (governor) declares himself Khalifah and says he has shubhat daleel, the real khalifah should still fight him and bring him under his authority.

The argument Majid uses that ?Amr imam yarfa ul-khilaf? (the imam resolves the disputes) assumes that the ruler is legitimate and adopts living by Islam. The society should then follow what the ruler has adopted since he resolves the disputes according to the above principle.

Majid justifies the current regimes as being Imams by equating ideologically differing terminologies. HT however does not see the current regimes as Imams or legitimate (as already explained) and therefore the above principle does not apply.

Furthermore, even if there was a legitimate Imam, he does not resolve every dispute. There are some matters which are outside his remit. For example, matters relating to his legitimacy. If he is usurper and he believes this is acceptable, this does not oblige those who believe the usurper needs to be removed. The scholars never gave this principle for such things - rather they said you should avoid fighting due to bloodshed.

Despite the fact that many political positions can be Islamically justified given the non-prescriptive nature of Islamic law on political matters, Maajid fails to cite or reference any countries that have made the Islamic creed the sole reference in managing their societies and security being in the hands of Muslims - the fact that a law appears similar to one that may exist in Islamic law does not mean it was derived from Islam otherwise the whole world would be seen as ruling by Sharia (and Dar al-Islam according to his definition of requiring Muslims to simply reside there).

Returning to the matter at hand, one can look at this matter from two perspectives ? the original divine texts that HT quote with their textual meanings and what the Jurists views were.

The texts which HT quotes are not open to difference of opinion ? they comprise texts that are fundamental and unambiguous. They are decisive in that the right of law/rule (hukm) is for Allah and revelation must be used when judging and ruling.
a) ?The right of rule is solely for Allah"[27].
b) ?Have you not seen those who declare they believe in the revelation that has come to you and to those before you? Their (real) wish is to resort together for judgement (in their disputes) to taghout"[28]
c) "...and whosoever does not rule by what Allah has revealed then such are the kafireen (disbelievers)"[29].
d) ?Judge between them by that which Allah has revealed and do not follow their desires and beware of them lest they seduce you from some part of that which Allah has revealed to you?[30].
e) ?Allah will never allow the disbelievers to have authority over the believers?[31].

When one reviews the classical jurists on this matter, they were emphatically decisive - some quotes are listed below to demonstrate the point:
Al-Razi states in his tafsir that this and the associated ayaat are general in their meaning and application requiring Muslims to implement Islam.
Ibn Abbas (ra) on this verse stated that anybody who denies a definitive judgement of Allah (swt) contained in the Shariah is a Kafir. He went on to say that anyone who says that the Rule of Allah (swt) does not have to be established or the rule of man is better than the Rule of Allah (swt) or the rules of man are just as good as the Rule of Allah (swt) is a Kafir. He also said that the one who does not deny Allah's (swt) Hukm, but believes that it is allowed to rule by other than what Allah (swt) has revealed, he is also a Kafir because he is denying that the right of Rule is solely for Allah (swt). This is the case even if he says that the rule of Allah (swt) is better than the rule implemented by man.
Ibn al-Qayyim said, "The correct view is that ruling according to something other than that which Allah has revealed includes both major and minor Kufr, depending on the position of the judge. If he believes that it is obligatory to rule according to what Allah has revealed in this case, but he turns away from that out of disobedience, whilst acknowledging that he is deserving of punishment, then this is lesser Kufr. But if he believes that it is not obligatory and that the choice is his even though he is certain that this is the ruling of Allah, then this is major Kufr.?[32]
Ibn Abeel-'Izz said, "Judging by other than what Allah has revealed could be kufr that expels one from the religion and could be a sin either a major sin or a minor one and it could be a symbolic kufr or minor kufr based on the two sayings and this all depends on the situation of the judge: So if he believes that judging by what Allah has revealed is not obligatory or that he has the option in this or if he dishonours it while being certain that it is the judgement of Allah then this is major kufr and if he believes in the obligation of judging by what Allah has revealed in this instance but turns away from it while recognizing that he deserves to be punished then he is a sinner and is to be referred to as a disbeliever symbolically or upon minor disbelief"[33].
Ibn Taymiyyah said, "Undoubtedly, whoever does not believe that it is obligatory to rule according to that which Allah has revealed to His Messenger is a Kafir, and whoever thinks it is permissible to rule among people according to his own opinions, turning away and not following which Allah has revealed is also a Kafir...So in matters which are common to the Ummah as a whole, it is not permissible to rule or judge according to anything except the Quran and Sunnah. No one has the right to make the people follow the words of a scholar or Ameer or shaykh or king. Whoever believes that he can judge between people according to any such thing, and does not judge between them according to revelation is a Kafir."[34]
Ibn Katheer made reference to the Tartars at his time, "?who put together for them a law book extracted from different laws of the Jews, the Christians and the Deen of Islam. It also contained many rules taken only from their own opinion and desires that later became a system of law followed by the people and given precedence over the Book of Allah (swt) and the Sunnah of his Messenger (saw) so the ruler who does that is a Kafir."[35]
Al-Shawkani said in one of his essays:
?a) That referring for judgement to Taghoot (i.e. non Islam) constitutes major Kufr.
b) That referring for judgement to Taghoot is just one of a number of actions of Kufr, each of which in its own is sufficient to condemn the one who does it as a Kafir.
c) He gives examples of Kufr, such as people agreeing to deny women their rights of inheritance and their persisting in co-operating in that, and he states that is major kufr?[36].
Even more recently, Sheikh Ahmad Shaakir said concerning acting upon these laws or submitting to it or approving of it: ?Verily the affair concerning these secular laws is as clear as the sun that it is clear Unbelief - Kufrun Buwaah?[37].

If Maajid has an alternative position to this, he has not documented it in his article nor has he addressed or refuted these fundamental points aside from his passing comment ?The two passages (Ay?t) from the Qur'?n that are referred to, though in themselves forming a theologically definitive source for proof (Qati'i al-Thub?t), their link to this particular subject matter as conditions (Shart) for the validity of a land (D?r) is inconclusive (Zanni)".

This statement is meaningless ? what does the term valid mean? And what does it mean when he conjuncts it to land, ?a valid land?? Legal to trade with, legitimate to conclude treaties, permitted for living in, forbidden to fight with, acceptable for practicing Islamic rituals therein, nor requiring migration etc. And here lies the crux of the confusion in Majid?s article and thought. His discussion of a Dar (land) is so vague and the term so broad, containing so many different issues the discourse becomes convoluted and he fails to prove anything. It appears he wishes to avoid having to respond to HT?s actual argument that looks at one decisive aspect - the Sharia requirement in every land of the world, namely, the implementation of Allah?s Sharia[38] ? and the responsibility of Muslims to initiate this process as their Messenger did before them and call the world to Islam without compromising, selling-out and trying to coexist with philosophies, ideologies and religions of disbelief (kufr).

6. HT Concepts and the Adoption Process

HT emphasizes the importance and significance of its intellectual culture, verifying any and every idea rigorously before adopting it. It cite revival movements have failed historically due to the lack of thought and clarity in the intellect culture adopted, particularly in the aims and methodologies[39]. Moreover, it is often a matter of confusion what constitutes the ideas and values a movement stands for and advocates, as opposed to personal thoughts and views of its adherents along with the continuous changes exhibited due to underlying pragmatic attitudes. HT concepts must undergo the process of adoption (tabanni), to adopt the strongest views and avoid disputes regarding what is and what is not the HT official view on a matter[40]. Furthermore, it ensures conformity with existing adoption through a process of intense intellectual scrutiny and critique. The adopted books comprise:
1) System of Islam
2) Party Structure
3) Concepts of Hizb al-Tahrir
4) The Islamic state
5) The Ruling System in Islam
6) The Economic System in Islam
7) The Social System in Islam
8) The Islamic Personality (3 Volumes)
9) Funds of the Khilafah state
10) Political Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir
11) Political views of Hizb ut-Tahrir
12) Muqadimat al-Dastoor (Introduction to the constitution)
13) Al-Dausiah
14) Essential Elements of the Islamic Nafsiyyah (Disposition)
15) Organisations of the Khilafah state - in ruling and administration

Maajid quotes the famous Wahabbite rebellion against the Ottoman state from Abdul Qadeem Zalloom?s book, ?How the Khilafah was Destroyed?. From this he questions why HT criticizes this rebellion if it is permitted for one to enact their ijtihad as per the HT methodology.

This attempt to refute HT adopted thought by using material the party has never adopted[41] is unusual. Why would someone who had studied with HT for so long, failed to understand this basic idea?

Firstly, it is one that is not taught when studying the early books of the party so it is possible Maajid did not study or hear of it. However, he quotes a partial definition in one of the footnotes in his article, illustrating he is aware of the idea but maybe not the centrality of the adoption process to the definition of HT as an entity. ?Adopted Party books are those books that are obligatory for a member to believe in and propagate. Members must not openly criticize adopted books even if they disagree with them...?[42]

Secondly, HT thought has inspired a range of literature to be produced by individuals influenced by their thought. To ensure this thought is not understood to be HT thought, the party only puts its name to material that it has adopted ? the book ?How the Khilafah was Destroyed?, cited by Maajid is not an adopted book.

Finally, the position articulated in the book is in fact consistent with the HT adopted views and not at variance as Maajid alleges. HT prohibits the enactment of any diverse view when the Imam or Khalif has adopted on a matter and there is no dispute that the Ottomans were valid Khalifs, a fact which the Wahabbites accepted, along with the jurists of the time. As such, the Wahabis were obliged to obey and submit to the rulers and not commit treason by colluding with the British to rebel against them.

The reality post-Khilafah is one where the legitimacy of installed rulers and agents is disputed as is the ideologies and creeds they implement. Thus there is no comparison between the two scenarios.

7. What are the Discussions of Dar al-Islam/Kufr about?

Majid?s states his first and ?most obvious? way of showing HT?s stance to be inconclusive, and ?the theological illegitimacy of enforcing their view that others are on Kufr?, is by showing ?Definitions of Dār al-Kufr and Dār al-Islām are not to be found in any verse of the Qur'ān or any Ĥadīth (prophetic traditions). One or two prophetic traditions (Aĥadīth), argued by many to be of weak authenticity, refer to the term Dār al-Ĥarb and another refers to Dār al-Kufr, but all fail to offer any definition of these terms. It is primarily due to this reason that the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture (see below)?[43].

The terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam have been derived from Quran and Sunnah, with all jurists agreeing to their core meanings, namely sharia must be applied and security cannot be with non-Muslims, and some ancillary aspects being disputed. A search through the major works of jurisprudence through Muslim history confirms this[44].

Majid does not reference where HT state ?...that others are on Kufr? as this is something that he contradicts himself when he cites HT?s view on difference of opinion and their tolerant views in relation to different views.

By stating that neither terms Dar al-Kufr and Dar al-Islam are to be found in any verse of Quran or any Hadith and thereby trying to argue the resulting notions are indecisive, Majid is exhibiting ignorance that would only be expected of a beginner studying Shariah. Whether technical terms appear or not in texts is not relevant - what is required is that he content of definitions of such terms should embody, reflect or concur with divine texts. If one wished to rebut him using his style of argument one would state the terms Dar, Islam and Kufr do appear in a number of texts as do their synonyms like Balad, Ard and Qarya. The conjunction of these and other terms in principle is also seen in the texts. Numerous examples of Islam and Kufr appear throughout the texts so no illustration is necessary - examples of Dar from authentic and non-daeef sources include:
Are you not aware of those who have preferred a denial of the truth to God's blessings, [41] and [thereby] invited their people to alight in that abode of utter desolation (Quran 14:28) ???????????? ?????????? ????? ??????????
And God invites unto the abode of peace, and guides him that wills onto a straight way (Quran 10:25) ???????? ??????? ????? ????? ?????????? ?????????
Theirs shall be an abode of peace with their Sustainer; and He shall be near unto them in result of what they have been doing (Quran 6:127) ?????? ????? ?????????? ????? ????????? ?????? ??????????? ????? ???????? ???????????
The Prophet (saw) said: ?Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen? [Sahih Muslim 4294/Nisai/Darimi ]
The Prophet (saw) said: ?I have been shown the land of your hijra? [Sahih Bukhari 12:202] ??????? ????? ????????????
The Propet (saw) said: ?Peace be upon you abode of the believers? [Sahih Muslim 2:53] ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ?????? ???????????
The Prophet (saw) said: ?Medina is the land of hijra and sunna? [Ahmed 1:372] ???????????? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ????????????
The Prophet (saw) said: ?Medina was the land of shirk? [Nisai 13:55] ???????????? ??????? ????? ??????
The Prophet (saw) said: ?And he carried me to the land of hijra? [Tirmidhi 12:176] ??????????? ????? ????? ???????????
Abdul Rahman bin ?Awf was speaking with Umar Bin Al-Khattab (ra) (who was the Khaleefah at the time) he said, ?Do not be harsh on them (speaking about some of the Hujaaj) until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.? [Sahih Bukhari 3713]
Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, ?The Prophet (saw), Abu Bakr and Omar (ra) where from the Muhajireen because they migrated from the Mushrikeen. Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar ul-Shirk and they came to the Prophet (saw) on the night of the Bay?ah al-Aqabah.? [an-Nisa?i]
From the companions, the letter of Khalid bin Walid mentions ?...as long as he lives in the dar al-hijrah and dar al-islam. If they leave the dar of the Muhajirs, the dar al-islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.? [Abu Ubaid, Kitaab al-Amwaal, pg. 98 & Abu Yusuf, Kitaab al-Kharaaj, pgs. 155-156]

Like most technically defined terms in the Islamic sciences (uloom) they do not appear in the source texts in their technical form, aside from linguistic references[45]. Maajid's argument if applied to other technical terms in the Islamic sciences, covering both decisive and indecisive ideas would result in one arguing:
the term aqeedah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., Allah?s existence is indecisive, as is the Messenger, as is the Day of Judgement etc.)
the terms uloom al-Quran, mushaf and asbab al-nuzool are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in Quran)
the terms uloom al-hadith, ahad, sahih, daeef, mawdooh, mashoor and mutawatir are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the Sunnah)
the term ijma al-sahabah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the consensus of the companions on matters including finality of the Prophethood)
the term sirah is not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so it is indecisive (i.e., doubt in the entire life of the Messenger)
the terms mandub, mubah, ruksah, azimah and fasid are not to be found in any verse of Quran or Hadith so they are indecisive (i.e., doubt in the shariah)

Historically, the Dar (land/territory) paradigm defined the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslim political sovereign entities and those between the Islamic state and its citizens from different regions and their situations[46]. These legal terms, like others deemed important in Islam (e.g., mukallaf, mandub, aqeedah, fasid, illah, ijma, isnad, matn, hadith etc), were coined by Muslim jurists in the early centuries of Islam with the formulation of the various disciplines. Although not defined by the texts, they were necessary as they encompassed realities, rules and values, both decisive and speculative, in relation to these relationships and how to manage them according to the scriptures. Their meanings were decisively rooted in divine texts, being determined from the Quran, the Sunnah and the practices of the companions[47]. They encompassed rules regarding matters of practicing Islam individually and collectively, migration, citizenship, war, security etc.

Over time a collective and agreed upon position emerged amongst the classical jurists - where Islamic rules (ahkam) are dominant comprises Dar al-Islam whilst Dar al-Harb would be where there was lawlessness and one?s life or property was not safe ? the Shariah must be implemented on all lands and security must be with Muslims. This bi-polar division of the world and the discouragement to reside in Dar al-harb where security was an issue meant that Muslims viewed Dar al-Islam as their lands whilst Dar al-Harb was viewed as the land of foreigners or the enemy.

However, in the twentieth century, the redefinition of the Muslim world along colonial inspired lines occurred and Muslims began to migrate to the West seeking economic betterment. These trends clashed with the classical views resulting in some modern jurists reopening this discussion arguing for redefining these positions according to the new colonialist defined realities, a pragmatic position at best. These included thinkers like Faysal Mawlawi, Mana Qattan, Yusuf Qardawi, Taha Jabir al-Alwani and most recently Tariq Ramadan who broadly argued for the integration of Muslims into the West and a re-consideration of international relations. Others like al-Nabhani argued that the normative rules of Islam were relevant to all times and places and as such the reality needed reconfiguring rather than reinterpreting and reconfiguring Islam[48].

There appears to be no desire by modern jurists to address the evidences which the classical jurists used with some going as far as to even deny the existence of the evidences[49]. One hadith in question is the narration by Sulayman al-Buraydah that clearly touched on this issue[50]:
?When the Messenger of Allah appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment? He would say??When you meet enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, accept it and restrain yourself from doing them harm. Invite them to Islam; if they respond, accept it from them and desist from fighting. Then invite them to migrate from their Dar to the Dar of Muhajireen and inform them that if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajireen. If they refuse, tell them they will have the status of the Bedouin Muslims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims??[51]

This text makes the point Medinah is different from other Dars, due to its rule and security, which affords privileges and obligations, different to the Bedouin Muslims who simply follow the commands of Islam. Likewise the letter of Khalid bin Walid to the people of Hira reflects the same notions:
?In a similar vein we can understand the letter Khalid b. Walid wrote to the people of Hira which states: I have granted (the people of Hira) that any of their elderly who is unable to work, afflicted by a plague, or became poor such that his co-religionists give him alms, then his jizyah will be waived and he and his family will be provided for from the Bayt al-Mal of the Muslims as long as he lives in the Dar al-Hira and Dar al-Islam. If they leave the Dar of the Muhajirs, the Dar al-Islam, then the Muslims are not obliged to maintain his family.?

In fact many evidences assume the existence of a Dar paradigm without which such texts make no sense and remain devoid of any application e.g., ?And if they incline towards peace, you also incline towards it?[52]. This is because these verses are not addressed to individuals but state entities. The Dar paradigm in jurisprudence is a legal term whose principles are valid for all times unlike international geopolitics which varies over time[53]. It is law and not political analysis, and defines how things should be (normative) and not how things are (positive). It is prescriptive whilst political paradigms are descriptive (observational) and predictive. Furthermore it is not monolithic but made of independent but interrelated parts. The absence of one part does not mean the absence or irrelevance of the other (e.g., the absence of occupation or a peace treaty does not invalidate the entire model)[54].

By initiating a discussion centred on these terms, Maajid provides no conceptual clarity on the subject, leaving the reader with a limited comparison of the various wordings used in the composition of some technical terms and the conclusion that this matter was contested ? a blatantly false conclusions. HT?s quote is accurate and correct when it states: ?Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims...?. Furthermore, Ibn Qayyim said, ?The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.?[55]

Regarding their ?astonishing? acceptance that there are differences of opinion, HT state that there have been differences expressed as to when Islamic land (Dar al-Islam) becomes Dar al-Kufr, and that these are nothing more than being descriptive definitions and not based on divine texts. As such, a review of the (historic) reality would eliminate the second condition that is stipulated as obviously incorrect (see example above) leaving the remaining two points which are agreed upon. More so, they are consistent with the decisive notions that the implementation of Sharia is required and the foreign systems and ideologies implemented in our societies post-colonialism are invalid and security must be in the hands of Muslims and not foreign powers.

8. Are the terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr decisive in HT Adopted Culture?

Maajid?s critique of HT centres on an analysis of the juristic views of what constitutes Islamic land and when this changes to non-Islamic land. His article comprises a number of citations that form the basis of his work, quoted from ?Way for Revival?[56]. However a key question that he appears to have overlooked is: does HT adopt or state any of these definitions are definite and decisive (qati) in their wording?

The answer appears to be no. In the adopted book, ?Mafaheem?, HT presents the results of their insight and complex analysis as to the causes of decline of the Muslim world. They then articulate the problem of institutionalized non-Islamic ideologies in the Muslim lands and provide a solution for the problem, which comprises the means for change (detailed in the books ?Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change?/?Party Structure?) along with the ideology of Islam with elaboration of its shape and form in a number of books (detailed in the adopted books ?System of Islam?, ?Economic System?, ?Social System? and ?Constitution?). The underlying premises and assumptions are articulated in the series of adopted books ?Islamic Personality?. At no point do they utilize the terms Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr in their analysis as definite and decisive definitions. Even the quote from ?Shaksiyyah Islamiyya?, does not state the definitions of the terms, utilising given wordings, are definite and not open to being defined using different terms ? nor does HT stipulate acceptance of these terms. What is expected and stipulated as decisive is that the Islamic lands must be ruled by Muslims and Islam, notions stated categorically and unambiguously by decisive texts, and found throughout HT?s works.
Maajid argues his objective is to show the inconsistency of HT adoption ? to successfully do so, he must demonstrate what HT state as decisive is to the contrary indecisive by elaborating the different views on that - otherwise all he demonstrates is that a definition is indecisive, a matter already known and acknowledged by HT - a futile exercise. With the collapse of this point, Maajid fails in his objective from the outset.

Thus the use of this point is nothing more than a ?red herring?.

9. Confusion Surrounding the Definition and Usage of Technical Terminology

A definition is a statement of the meaning of a term, word or phrase[57]. Definitions assist discussions by agreeing on common terminologies which alleviate the need to consistently refer to the underlying definition. The need for precision and accuracy in definitions is important.

Definitions are of two kinds:
? Descriptive, one which is generally used, or,
? Stipulative, one where a new meaning is imposed on an existing term.

Furthermore, they may be:
? Intensional which specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing being a member of a specific set, often seen in attempts to set out the essence of something, such as that by genus and differentia, or,
? Extensional, where it specifies its extension, for example a list naming every object that is a member of a specific set.

In Arabic, terms may have a linguistic usage and a technical usage. Both can acquire definitions in the above manner. Islamic scholarship has traditionally focused discussion on technical definitions of terms. These comprise terms that are discussed and defined by the Sharia texts (e.g., salat, zakat, hajj, siyam etc), terms that are descriptive (e.g., mutawatir, ahad, sanad, qati, zanni etc) and terms that are necessitated through textual injunctions in order to understand and apply sharia rules (Dar al-Islam, Aqeedah, Ijma, Illah etc).

The terms Dar al-Islam/Kufr have not been explicitly defined by the Sharia texts, however the Sharia texts necessitate their recognition in order for their implementation. For example, the texts relating to war and peace in Islam recognize relations between states and attempt to regulate them.

As such, due to the need to define terms to which these and others rules could be applied, the classical jurists coined the term ?Dar? (land/domain) and articulated definitions in relation to it. These definitions are generally stipulatively and intensionally defined[58] although some are extensional making like comparisons between definitions more difficult. Added to this is the fact that some jurists did not explicitly document definitions of these terms however utilised them whilst discussing jurisprudence.

The jurists generally utilised the term Dar in relation to the divine rules relating to the following concepts ? as such, they were relevant when considering what constitutes Islamic land and what does not. The concepts below are mentioned in a number of divine texts, however, as most scholars generally did not enumerate them (which would be seen in an extensional definition) it is debatable which concepts are included in their definitions and which are not. There is no Sharia requirement that all these concepts are embedded in one definition ? what is important is that the Sharia rules are not changed or abandoned through the use of definitions:
? authority and ruling
? security and safety
? war and peace
? practice of Islam (outside the state)
? migration
? ownership of land

Maajid?s review of the definitions surmises there is a dispute amongst the jurists with some accepting a land as Islamic based on authority and security whilst others accept ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present. He thus concludes from this superficial understanding of the definitions that there is a dispute on the underlying Shariah rules.

Firstly he has not quoted one scholar who defines Dar al-Islam simply based on the ability to practice Islam or when its signs are present.

Secondly he is confusing discussions amongst the Jurists that relate to different Sharia rules and attempts to derive definitions from those discussions, ?ijtihad on ijtihad?, his citation of Dusuqi is one such example examined below. Jurists discussed all the above issues without limiting Dar al-Islam in the way Maajid is attempting to as can be seen in the example from al-Mughni (vol. 8, p. 457) under the discussion of people with respect to migration (hijra): "One of those who must migrate is one who is unable to show his deen and is not able to establish the obligatory duties (wajibaat) of his deen due to his residence with the unbelievers. On such it is obligatory to migrate as Allah said: "Lo! as for those whom the angels take (in death) while they wrong themselves, (the angels) will ask: In what were ye engaged? They will say: We were oppressed in the land. (The angels) will say: Was not Allah?s earth spacious that ye could have migrated therein? As for such, their habitation will be hell, an evil journey?s end." (Quran 4:97)?

Thirdly, this argument is conceptually flawed as it focuses entirely on the variations of the form of definitions whilst ignoring the intended meanings (i.e., the substance of the definitions), putting the cart before the horse so to speak. It also violates the usooli principle which makes this very point: ?? ????? ?? ???????? ?? ?? ????? ????? ???? ????? ?????? ???????? ???? ????????

Thus, even if for the sake of argument, a scholar was to define a land as Dar al-Islam based on the ability of a Muslim to practice his deen, he is not stating that it is legitimate to rule and enforce kufr, but is highlighting the fact that the Muslim does not need to migrate to somewhere he can practice his deen. Likewise, if one were to define the land as Dar al-kufr if the ruling system is kufr, he would not be stating that Muslims cannot practice their deen there and must migrate ? he is stating that Islam requires the system needs changing. As such, the two definitions would not be in conflict in substance, simply in form. Maajid has ignored this point and deemed a contradiction when there is none.

He has also failed to note the implications of his analysis if his reasoning was applied to other definitions. It is well recognised that virtually every term in Islam is contested, even those as fundamental as Imaan, Muslim and Quran ? one would be hard pressed to identify a definition which had a consensus. Would one conclude these (and all) matters are doubtful and speculative? Obviously not. Some examples are highlighted below.

? Definition of the Quran
The definition of the term, Quran, according to the Hanafi linguist Jurjani in his book on technical definitions is ?revelation to the Messenger compiled in the Musaahif and transmitted through tawatur means without doubt?[59].
According to Sharawi[60] it is ?speech of God, revealed to the final Prophet in the Arabic language, worship when recited, compiled in the Uthman mushaf and transmitted via tawatur (decisive) means?.
And according to Aamidi ?The word of Allah is revealed to his slave Muhammad in Arabic. It is a miracle (Ijaaz) in even the shortest surah, it is written down and narrated to us through tawatur, through which we worship Allah by reading it, it starts with surah al-Fatiha and ends with al-Naas?[61].
If the definitions are compared, it is apparent there are a number of differences, including ?speech of God?, ?in the Arabic language? and ?worship when recited?. If Maajid?s reasoning was applied in this case, one would conclude that the Quran being the speech of God or in Arabic is disputed hence zanni (speculative). However, the jurists (as well as all Muslims) did not dispute these matters and agreed they are decisive (qati) due to the evidence.

? Definition of Shaheed (martyr)
According to the Hanafis: ?One who is killed by the pagans, or is found killed in the battle bearing a mark of any wound, whether external or internal - such as blood emerging from an eye or the like.?[62]
?Anyone who is killed while fighting pagans, or rebels, or brigands, by a means attributed to the enemy - whether directly or by consequence - is a shaheed, anyone who is killed by a means not specifically attributed to [an action of] the enemy is not considered a shaheed.?[63]
According to the Malikis: ?One killed while fighting warring unbelievers only, even if killed on Islamic land such as if the enemy attacked the Muslims, [even if he] did not fight on account of being unaware or asleep, [and even if] killed by a Muslim who mistook him for an unbeliever, or trampled by a horse, or mistakenly by his own sword or arrow, or having fallen into a well or from a cliff during the fighting.?[64]
According to the Shafi?s: ?One who is killed in fighting unbelievers, facing and not running away, for the raising of Allah?s word?and not for any worldly motive.?[65]
Ibn Hajar has mentioned fourteen means by which a person can acquire the title, some of them specifically related to being killed in the path of Allah and others not.[66]
According to the Hanbalis: ?One who dies in a battle with the unbelievers, whether male or female, adult or not, whether killed by the unbelievers, or by his own weapon in error, or by having fallen off his mount, or having been found dead with no mark, provided he was sincere.?[67]

From the above, it may be argued that martyrdom is speculative as the definitions are contested, whereas the notion of martydom whilst engaged in war ordained by Allah is in fact a decisive concept in Islam. There are speculative issues in aspects that relate to it but that does not detract from the decisiveness of the issue.

Technical terms are also used in different contexts to reflect varying realities ? for instance, the definition and qualification of the terms mujahid/shaheed of the dunya and akhira are defined differently, in order to apply sharia rules. However, one does not conclude from these that the whole matter of being a mujahid/shaheed

22-09-2007, 01:32

Technical terms are also used in different contexts to reflect varying realities ? for instance, the definition and qualification of the terms mujahid/shaheed of the dunya and akhira are defined differently, in order to apply sharia rules. However, one does not conclude from these that the whole matter of being a mujahid/shaheed is disputed simply due to the attempt at scholars in articulating concise and precise definitions reflecting texts and their rules. The term Sunnah for instance has several technical uses across the different Islamic sciences, even multiple usages within a given science. It is used to refer to Masdar Shariah (second source of law), Sirah (Kutub al-Sunnah are books of biography), Hadith (Kutub al-Sunnah are narrations), Mandoub (recommended), Nafl (superogratory), Medina (Dar al-Sunnah), Political group (as opposed to the Shia) etc. These multi-usages were normal and accepted and never contradicted Shariah rules.

Likewise, some jurists[68] also utilised the terms Dar al-Islam in relation to ownership of land conquered by non-Muslims (in a mannter contemporary Muslim allude to Spain being Muslim land) or whether Muslims could practice their religion there or were required to migrate - categorising such lands Dar al-Islam or al-Kufr was an issue of which definition they would be a more appropriate subset. These considerations never conflicted with divine texts and the rules thereof. Not one jurist in any of these discussions attempted to justify the rule of non-Islamic law or creeds solely focusing on issues of ownership or practice - a point Maajid has failed to note.

All of them however entertained the notion rule by the Islamic Shariah was required. Thus it is seen Abu Hanifah believed an unjust ruler must be fought, let alone one who rules by kufr. That is why he funded the rebellion of Imam Zayd against the Umayyad Khalifah Hisham bin Abdel Malik bin Marwan and he funded the rebellion of Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyyah against al-Mansur, the Abbasid Khalifah.

The point here is not a dispute on definitions. The point here, which HT adopted culture argues and thus makes the whole definition dispute irrelevant, is that Sharia must be implemented and it is forbidden to implement/enforce non-Islamic ideologies. Not one of Maajid?s quoted scholars differs with HT and no jurist disputes this.

10. Systematic Misquotation of the Classical Scholars

Majid makes the statement ?...the definitions are vastly differed over by the Jurists (Mujtahidīn) as each one simply extracted what seemed plausible to him from scripture?[69]. However, upon checking the quotes Maajid has used in relation to the classical scholars, a number of discrepancies emerge indicating misrepresentation of the classical jurists and systematic misquotation of them in a way that appears to support his conclusions[70]. Some examples are cited to illustrate this point below.

Bujayrimi?s Quote
Al-Bujayrimi incorporates the ideas mentioned above in his actual definition which Maajid ignored. He instead selected only a part of al-Bujayrimi?s explanation of his definition whilst ignoring the definition itself and the rest of the explanation. Maajid said, "al-Imam al-Bujayrimi... maintains that Dār al-Islām is a place where Muslims reside even if there are non-Muslims present.?
However the actual quote of Sulayman bin Mohammed al-Bujayrimi in Sharh al-Bujayrimi ala al-Khatib is as follows:
??? ?????. ????: (?? ??? ???????) ?? ??? ?????? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ??? ??? ?? ????? ???????? ??????? ??? ?????? ?? ????? ???????? ?? ????? ?????? ???? "??? ?????"
Sharh Rowd: "(About Dar al-Islam) that Muslims live there even if there were with them there ahl al-dhimma (those protected by the Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it."
And in his book, Nihaya al-Muhtaj, al-Bujayrimi provides an actual definition of Dar al-Islam along with an explanation:
???? ??????????: ?? ??? ??? ???? ???? ????? ??????? - ????? ????? ????? ???????: ??? ??? ?? ??????? ?? ?????? ???????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ??? ???? ?? ????? ????????? ???????? ??? ??????? ?? ????? ???????? ??? ?????? ???????
"Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear and it is intended by the phrase "appearance of the Islamic laws" every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma (those protected by Muslim Rulers), or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it."
Maajid?s attempt to argue this meaning applies to individual practice of Islam is incorrect as the definition (along with its elaboration) is general and from the language this would include both societal and individual laws of Islam. This would most certainly include the rulers as he states Dar al-Islam is the ENTIRE LAND WHERE THE ISLAMIC LAWS APPEAR, as it is unqualified without any references limiting the matter to individual matters alone ? furthermore, he clearly states terms like ?ahl al-dhimma?, ?opened up by Muslims? and ?it was given to govern by non-Muslims? which all relate to authority. As such this the exact meaning of the Arabic language and is not an ideologically inspired reading as Maajid alleges.
Majid?s selective quote of a part of al-Bujayrimi?s explanation omits an important part ?even if there were ahl al-dhimma? ? a term which indicates these Muslims are living under Islamic authority as ahl al-dhimma do not come into being unless the land is under Islamic rule and these people pay the jizyah and are afforded security. Revealingly, al-Bujayrimi discusses this issue in the chapter of Jihad, and the whole chapter details the Imam?s responsibilities and involvement in this obligation. It appears Majid is taking a secular interpretation and twisting the texts for his own political ends.

Mawardi?s Quote
Maajid quotes Imam Shawkani from Nayl al-Awtar as stating that Maawardi believed ?If it becomes possible to manifest ones religion (Din) in any Kufr land, then that land becomes by such a virtue Dār al-Islām?. Shawkani does not state this in his book ? he quotes Mawardi in his chapter of Jihad in relation to the initial obligation of jihad, whether it is singular (ayn) or collective (kifaya). Mawardi?s view he states is that ?the obligation was originally individual on all of those who emigrated from Mekkah...?[71].

Kasani?s Quote
Maajid lifts the criteria of when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-kufr without documenting Kasani?s actual definition which Kasani discussed in Badai al-Sinaai clarifying the two essential aspect of Dar al-Islam that are understood from the divine texts, akin to HT?s elaboration in Shaksiyyah Islamiyya:
??????????? ????? ????????? ????? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ???????? ????? ???? ???????????? ??????? ????????? ? ?????????? ??????? ???????? ???? ???????????? ???? ???? ????????? ????????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ?????? ? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ? ?????????? ????? ?????????? ? ????????? ???????????? ??? ?????????? ? ???????????? ??? ???????? ????????? ???????????? ??????????? ????????? ?????????????? ? ??????? ?????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????? ?????? ??????? ????? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ? ????????? ??????? ???????? ????? ???????????? ????????? ????????? ???????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ????????? ??????? ? ??????? ??????? ????? ????????? ????????? ????????? ????????? ?????? ?????????? - ??????????? ?????????? - ???????? . ( ?????? ) ?????? ????? ????????? - ???????? ??????? - ????? ???????????? ???? ???????? ???????? ???? ???????????? ??????????? ?????? ???? ?????? ???????????? ??????????? ? ?????????? ???????????? ???? ????????? ??????????? . ??????????? ????? ?????????? ??? ????? ??????????????? ?????? ????? ???????????? ? ??????????? ???????????? ????? ???????????? ? ?????? ????? ???????????? ? ?????? ????? ?????????? ?????? ???????????? ????? ???????????? ? ??????????? ??????????????? ????? ???????????? ? ?????? ????? ????????? ?????????????? ??????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ????? ???????????? ??????????? ? ??????? ?????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???????
?Dar al-Islam and Dar al-kufr is the conjunction of Dar (land) with Islam and Kufr ? and when you conjunct Dar to Islam or Kufr, it is determined by the presence of Islam or Kufr therein. Like when you say Paradise land of peace, or Hell land of torment, you find peace in paradise and torment in hell and the appearance of Islam and Kufr is the appearance of its rules. And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus the appropriate term. And thus Dar became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the laws of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr laws in it (and Allah knows best). And the crux of this is according to Abu Hanifa (ra) in relation to the land being Islamic or otherwise is not the essence of Islam or kufr but the issues of aman (security) and khawf (anxiety/fear) ? and its meaning is that if the safety was for the Muslims absolutely and anxiety for non-Muslims absolutely so it is Dar al-Islam and if the safety was for the non-Muslim absolutely and anxiety for Muslims then it is Dar al-kufr and the ahkam depend on the safety and anxiety and not on Islam and kufr so it was considered safety and anxiety foremost.?

Ibn Qayyim?s Quote
Ibn Qayyim?s view is the most critical of Maajid?s usage and conclusions from the quotes ? Ibn Qayyim?s conclusion was that there is a collective (majority) position amongst the jurists which is congruent with HT?s position with an emphasis of the dominance of Islam.
Ibn Qayyim said, ?The Jamhoor (majority) of the Ulema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant that is Dar al-Islam. If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered.?[72]

Dusuqi?s Quote
Dusuqi, in his chapter on Jihad, discusses the Sharia rules in relation to non-Muslims who enter the Muslim lands, take their wealth and later try to resell it to them. Following this he extends the discussion in relation to the occupation of Muslim lands and when those lands become Dar al-Harb. In this context he states that the lands remain Islamic despite their occupation so long most or all the signs (sha?air) of Islam are established there. Maajid has taken this statement out of its actual context which is when Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Harb and presented it as the Maliki view of Dar al-Islam. At no point does Dusuqi state that this is the definition of Dar al-Islam. The original quote is below in its full context.
( ???? : ??? ??? ???? ????? ??? ) ?? ? ???? ?? ????? ?????? ?????? ?????? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ?????? ???? ? ??? ????? ??? ??? ??????? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ???? ?? ??????? ???? ?????? ????? ??????? ????? ??????? ? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ???? ??? ??? ???? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ???? ????? ??????? ????? ???? ( ???? : ?????? ???? ) ?? ?? ?????? ???? ??? ??? ?????? ????? ( ???? : ?? ? ???? ??????? ?????? ??? ?????? ) ??? ??????? ?? ?????? ? ???? ?? ???? ????? ???? ???? ??? ??? ??????? ?? ?????? ?? ??? ?? ???? ?? ?????? ? ???? ??? ??? ????? ???? ?? . ( ???? : ??????? ??? ) ?? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????? ? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?????? ???? ?????? ???? ??? ????? ??????? ?? ? ??? ???? ??? ????? ?????? ?? ?? ???? ?????? ??? ?? ????? ?? ???? ????? ??????? ? ???? ??? ???? ? ???? ???? ?????? ?????? ???? ???????? ?? ???? ????? ?????? ??? ?????? ?? ??????? . ???????? ???????? ??? ???? ? ???????? ?????? ?? ????? ?????? ????? ?? ????? ???? ????? ( ???? : ?? ? ???? ) ?? ?????? ( ???? : ?? ????? ?????? ????? ??? ) ???? ????? ????? ?? ????? ??? ???? ???? ???? ????? ?? ??????? ? ??? ?????? ? ??? ?????? ?? ?????? ??? ?????? ??? ?? ???? ???? ??? ?? ????? ???????? ???? ????? ??? ????? ????? ? ??? ????? ?????? ???? ?? ???? ?? ???? ??? ?? ? ???? ?? ????? ?? ?????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????? ? ?????? ??? ???? ???? ??? ?? ?????? ?? ??????? ???? ???? ???? ? ??? ???? ??????? ?? ???? ??? ??? ????? ????????? ????? ?? ??? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ???? ? ???? ?? ???? ????? ??????? ?? ?????? ????? ???? ??? ???? ??? ???

Relisting Maajid?s summary of the positions of the different schools of thought produces quite a different result, one that is remarkably similar to HT?s presentation of the matter in Shaksiyyah Islamiyya that Majid refers to[73]:
?Similarly there is no disagreement that the land of Islām (Dār al-Islām) is the land that submits to the rule of Islām and is ruled by Muslims even if its inhabitants were Muslims or Zimmis. And the scholars (fuqaha) also said that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam by the appearance of the Islamic rules within it. However they differed as to what changes Dār al-Islām into Dār al-Kufr. Some jurists (Mujtahidīn) said that Dār al-Islām does not become a Dār al-Kufr except by three conditions: firstly, the appearance of the rules of Kufr in it. Secondly, that it is bordering Dār al-Kufr. Thirdly, that there does not remain in it any Muslim or non-Muslim under a covenant (Zimmi) secured by the first security (Amān) which is the security of Muslims.?

al-Rāfi'ī states, ?It is not conditional to Dār al-Islām that Muslims reside there, rather being in the hands of the Imam and his Islām is sufficient.?
Imam Mawardi said,? Dar al-Harb is Dar al-Kufr, where Kufr law is dominant.? [al-Insaaf,Vol. 4 pg. 122]
al-Bujayrimi said ?Dar al-Islam is the entire land where the Islamic laws (ahkam al-Islam) appear? further elaborating this definition ?by this it is meant every law from its laws, or Muslims live there even if there were with them ahl al-dhimma, or it was opened up by Muslims, or it was given to govern by the hand of non-Muslims or they were living there and were expelled by the kuffar from it?
Al-Ba'lawi considers ?Any place at which a resident Muslim is capable of defending himself against hostile forces for a period of time is Dār al-Islām, where his judgments can be applied at that time and those times following it.?

Al-Sarakhsī defines it as ?A place which is under the authority or ownership of Muslims and the proof is that Muslims are secure therein.?
Al-Sarkhasi said, ?A Dar (piece of land/nation) becomes Dar al-Muslimeen (Islamic nation) when the Islamic rules become dominant (and apparent).? [Sarkhasi, Sharh as-Seerah al-Kabeer, Vol. 5 pg. 2197]
Al-Kāsānī states, ?There is no difference between our companions (the Ĥanafī's) that Dār al-Kufr becomes Dār al-Islām due to the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein.?
Al-Kasani said ?And when the laws of kufr appeared in the land it became the land of kufr thus this is the appropriate term. And Dar (a land) became Dar al-Islam with the appearance of the ahkam (laws) of Islam without any other conditions. Likewise it became Dar al-kufr with the appearance of kufr ahkam in it?
Al-Kasani also said, ?There is no disagreement among the ahnaaf (scholars of the Hanafi Madhab), that Dar al-Kufr becomes Dar al-Islam, when the rules of Islam becomes dominant. Our brothers only dispute on how Dar al-Islam transfers to become Dar al-Kufr. Our Imam (Abu Hanifa) said, ?Dar al-Islam becomes Dar al-Kufr in three (situations); when the law and order becomes Kufr, when the state has a border with a Kufr (state) without treaty or when there is no longer any security for the Muslim or the Dhimmi (citizens).? [Badai al-Sanaai, Vol. 7 pg. 131]
Abū Yūsuf believed, ?The land is considered Dār al-Islām by the appearance (Zuhūr) of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām therein even if the majority of its people where disbelievers, and it is considered Dār al-Kufr for the appearance of the rulings (Aĥkām) of Kufr therein even if the majority of its people were Muslims?
Ibn ?Ābidīn stated, ?Indeed, Dār al-Ĥarb becomes Dār al-Islām by establishing the rulings (Aĥkām) of Islām such as the Friday prayer and the 'Eid prayer; even if the indigenous non-Muslims remain therein and that country is not adjoined to Dār al-Islām.?

Ibn Mufliĥ writes that Dār al-Islām is every place where the rulings of Muslims are predominant.
Ibn Muflih stated ?There are only two, Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr. Any Dar (domain) where Islamic law is dominant is Dar al-Islam, and any domain where Kufr law is dominant is Dar al-Kufr, there are only these two camps [Al-Adaab al-Shari?ah, Vol. 1 pg. 190]
Ibn al-Qayyim maintains ?Dār al-Islām is the land upon where Muslims descended and upon where the rulings of Islām were executed. Any land upon where the rulings of Islām were not executed was not Dār al-Islām.?
Ibn Qayyim said, The Jumhour (majority) of theUlema say, Dar al-Islam is where the Muslims go and reside and the Islamic rules are dominant. If people (the Muslims) reside in one place and Islam becomes dominant, that is Dar al-Islam If however, Islam does not become dominant it is not (considered) Dar al-Islam even if it is in close proximity to the state. Taaif was so close to Makkah (at the time when Makkah was Dar al-Islam) but it did not become part of Dar al-Islam until it was conquered. [Ibn Qayyim, Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah, Vol. 1 pg. 366]

Ibn Hazm states ?Because the land (Dār) is associated to the person dominant over it, its ruler and its king.? [74]

On reviewing the corrected list, Ibn Qayyim?s view that the jamhoor (majority) had a consistent view relating to Islamic rules and authority begins to emerge not that portrayed by Maajid, more so with the inclusion of additional quotes of some other jurists including al-Nabhani of HT[75]:
Taqiudeen al-Nabhani (Shafii) said, ?The truth is that in considering the land as Dar al-Islam or Dar al-Kufr, two matters must be looked into: firstly, the rule by Islam and secondly the security by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority (sultan). If the land augments these two elements i.e. it rules by Islam and the security is by the security of Muslims i.e. by their authority, then it becomes a Dar al-Islam and changes from a Dar al-Kufr to a Dar al-Islam. Whereas if it loses one of the two, it does not become a Dar al-Islam. Similarly if Dar al-Islam does not rule by the rule of Islam then it is Dar al-Kufr. The same if it rules by Islam but its security is not by the security of Muslims i.e. their authority, then it also becomes Dar al-Kufr. Hence all the lands of Muslims today are Dar al-Kufr because they do not rule by Islam?[76].
Qadi Abu Ya?la (Hanbali) said, ?Any country where the law is Kufr (disbelief) instead of Islam is Dar al-Kufr?[77].
Mohammad bin Ali al-Shawkani (Zaidi) said, ?When we speak about a Dar (dominion) by whoever?s word being dominant, we mean if the command and prohibition is for the Muslims, in a way that no one from the Kuffar becomes dominant with his Kufr except by what is granted him from Islam, then that is considered Dar ul-Islam?[78].
Sayyid Qutb said, ?The whole world in the eyes of Islam is divided into two, the first is Dar al-Islam, and the second is Dar al-Harb. Dar al-Islam is where the Shari?ah of Islam alone is implemented, regardless of whether the inhabitants are all Muslims or Muslims mixed with Dhimmi (Jews and Christians) or if all of the citizens are Dhimmi with only some Muslims in power. Dar al-Harb is any land where the Kufr law is dominant even if everybody in the land is Muslim"[79].

Historically no jurist disputed or rejected the core decisive textual issues, however certain branches were differed over due to ijtihad on zanni texts, (e.g., the signs (sha'air) of Islam from the narrations instructing warriors not to attack lands where azan is heard or mosques exist). The core issues comprise implementation of the Islamic creed in societal life along with all aspects thereof which are decisive. The scholars Maajid quotes are congruent with this understanding and there are no differences on this point despite minor variations in the wording of their definitions.

11. Monolithic theories?

Maajid?s thesis that HT?s theory is nothing but a legal opinion assumes the party's understanding is homogenous which is incorrect. HT?s work comprises an understanding, definition and articulation of the problem and reality, following which is the process of scriptural analysis to determine the proposed normative solution. Aspects of each process may or may not be decisive depending on the case in question ? it is most certainly not homogenous.

HT?s assertion would be that the discussions of the problem, its reality and associated rules of jurisprudence that are discussed are decisive whereas aspects of its methodology for change, systems and proposed policies are open to interpretation. To bunch the lot together as Maajid has done and state it is all nothing but legal opinion which is indecisive is erroneous.

The decisive reality which HT's ijtihad of transformation is built upon has not been addressed by Maajid especially as it is elaborated in a number of adopted HT books which all who study with HT are required to study (?The Islamic State?, being one such example and summarised in section 3 above).

HT have never argued that their attempt at changing the colonialist inspired reality is one where the methodology is decisive - it is acknowledged there are potentially alternative ijtihads. Maajid however fails to cite any other such methodology in his critique; however, in subsequent media interviews he has approvingly spoken of the legitimacy and openness of one of the most avowed secular systems in the Muslim world, the Turkish political system.

12. Will HT unify the Muslim world through violent means?

This is a point Maajid mentions and emphasises further in his media interviews in an attempt to link HT with violence - ?every single Muslim government, then forcibly unite them into one military state even if it means killing millions of people?. He however has failed to quote any text HT where this has been stated.

Maajid?s reference in his interviews to ?How the Khilafah was destroyed? as the source for this view is incorrect ? firstly this book is not an adopted HT book. Secondly the pages highlighted by Newsnight during Maajid?s interview of the 11/09/2007 refer to a discussion not about the foreign policy of the forthcoming Caliphate, however, a policy, based on Islamic notions of vital issues, the state should have enforced that would have prevented the political intrigue that plagued its final days and its eventual dismemberment.

The full context of discussion from the chapter "The vital issues according to Islam" is:
Whosoever changes their religion (apostasy from Islam) the punishment is death - evidences supporting this are quoted along with an example from Imam Ali's rule and the subversive activities of Kemal without this punishment being applied. He concludes this is a vital issue and no matter how many people apostasise from Islam, the state should enforce capital punishment even if it amounted to millions (a conclusion which it is argued emanates from divine texts)[80].
A similar discussion arises in relation to the unity of the Islamic State; the author states this rule in the context of the dismemberment of the Khilafah state and not in the context of unifying the currently divided Muslim lands, "The situation reached the point where Muslims lived in several states...Hence it came as no surprise when Mustapha Kemal declared the dismemberment of Turkey from the rest of the Islamic lands... So the calamity took place and the Muslims became indifferent towards having to live in several states...Hence it is imperative to restore this issue to its rightful place and to consider it as a vital issue, THUS PREVENTING THE DISMEMBERMENT OF ANY COUNTRY FROM THE BODY OF THE KHILAFAH even if this led to several years of fighting and even if it led to killing of millions of Muslims"[81].
The concept is provided in relation to the matter of kufr law being implemented in the Khilafah state[82].

Nowhere does it state in ?How the Khilafah was destroyed? that HT intends to spill blood or kill in order to unify the countries in the future. The title of the book and the discussion quoted above all state clearly their belief in vital issues, these should be implemented internally so as to prevent division of any territory from the Khilafah and had they been implemented the catastrophe could have been prevented. Maajid?s interpretation of these ideas in relation to what the potential foreign policy of unifying lands outside the state is incorrect and unsubstantiated.

In fact in its adopted book, ?Party Structure?, HT state:
?Islam should be propagated universally while working to implement it must be confined to one or several countries until it becomes firmly established. Once established, the Islamic State would naturally grow until it encompasses all the Islamic countries. Then the state would propagate Islam to the rest of the world, because the Islamic State must convey the Islamic da?wah as an eternal and universal message for all mankind.?[83]

13. New Political Pawns?

In the aftermath of 9/11, Tony Blair said he "believed passionately that we are at mortal risk" from Islamism[84]. Since 2003, there have been a number of articles and conferences written globally suggesting that HT might present a serious threat and there have been a number of orchestrated attempts to try to link HT to terrorism.

Jean-Francois, a former Swiss civil servant and historian, in his research paper entitled ?Hizb ut-Tahrir--The Next al-Qaeda, Really?? cites a number of examples[85]:
"On 8 September 2003 the Russian news agency Rosbalt published an article, ?Hizb ut-Tahrir to replace Al-Qaida?? Views very critical of the international Muslim political party Hizb ut-Tahrir... have been expressed for some time in the former Soviet Union. There have also been several attempts to link it... to violent actions, such as the March and July 2004 events in Uzbekistan, although initial allegations in that case were received with scepticism by most observers and the group itself firmly rejected them.
In the West too, since 2003, there have been a number of articles suggesting that Hizb ut-Tahrir might present a serious threat... a frequently quoted report published in late May 2003 by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think-tank based in Washington, DC... the author, Ariel Cohen, a research fellow... describes Hizb ut-Tahrir as a clandestine, totalitarian organization... Cohen emphasizes ? conveniently forgetting to mention that disclosure of membership is a sure way to jail in some Central Asian countries, and that Hizb ut-Tahrir organizes public meetings and is easily accessible by media in those parts of the world where it can operate freely. While the organization tends to be somewhat secretive, it is certainly not clandestine in such places[86].
In February 2004, the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think-tank, organized a closed conference on Hizb ut-Tahrir in Ankara, Turkey. While there was a general agreement among participants that Hizb ut-Tahrir ?as a group has never been involved in terrorist activities?, some suggested that it acted as ?a ?conveyor belt? for producing terrorists?[87].
In June 2003, a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG)[88] provided a detailed analysis of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Central Asian. According to the authors, ?[t]he evidence suggests that Hizb ut-Tahrir is far from presenting a present-day threat to the stability of the Central Asian states in any direct senses. There is no evidence that it has any military capabilities, only limited evidence that it would even contemplate a call to arms under present conditions ??"

This increasing attention given to the potential threat of HT?s radical call, even led to Tony Blair announcing on Friday on 5 August 2005 that he planned to proscribe HT, a solely political organisation with a history of non-violence spanning more than fifty years. With no political party ever being banned in modern Britain, and even the notorious Sinn Fein being permitted to operate despite links with the IRA, this created significant waves and opposition in the UK. This has led the establishment in general, and security services in particular, to seek political actors in an attempt to combat their ideas. This trend is reflected in the Middle East, with Saudi and Egyptian regimes funding programmes to combat Islamist thought as per the recommendations of pretty much all Western think tanks and policy advisors. Egypt has had some success with figures that have been "detoxed" in Egyptian prisons, including the highly publicised example of Dr Fadl of Gemaa Islamiyya; as such this poses serious questions about the motives of the author.

Maajid?s resignation of HT following his retrn from Egypt came as a surprise to all. It is unusual why he would remain committed to HT on his return if he changed his ideas whilst in prison as he claims. Stranger still that he did not raise or escalate his concerns or doubts within HT for a response or clarification - something a member is obliged to do and swearing an oath by Allah on becoming a member. Notwithstanding this, his recent public posture in combating HT, his announcement of a series of rebuttal articles, his close relationship with the media, his self-professed difficult situation in the Egyptian prison[89] (including 3 months isolation and his subsequent illumination), his early (unconditional) release, his collaboration with and contributions to Ed Hussain's book, the roundly condemned ?The Islamist?, his subversive activities on return to the UK[90] and regular references to Egyptian ?ullema?, are indicative his new direction appears to have began under the Egyptian regime's pressure during his period of incarceration. When one is isolated and unsupported, especially by the group of which you are a member, facing serious charges by a tyrannical regime, one is vulnerable, open to advances and suggestions one would normally not entertain. It is a recognized phenomenon in prisoners and these situations are easily taken advantage of. In Maajid?s case his only helpers comprised the UK government (represented by its Cairo consulate), his local MP, Amnesty International, London Solicitors and the national and local media during this period[91].

There is also a strong commonality in Maajid Nawaz, Ed Hussain and Shiraz Maher?s attempts at combating HT, from a call to oppose ?Islamists? from hijacking Islam for their narrow political goals, a return to an authentic brand of Islam and the attempts at portraying HT as a ?conveyor belt for terrorism? ? reflecting Zeyno Baran?s phrase of the conservative Nixon Centre. These latter arguments have been summarily discounted by Jean-Francois in his research paper entitled ?Hizb ut-Tahrir?The Next al-Qaeda, Really?? and by the only established research on HT by Exeter university academic Suha Taji Farouki[92]. On BBC?s Newsnight on 11/09/2007, Maajid?s attempt at highlighting a connection between HT activities and violence comprised one single example, from his twelve years of activism, of the killing of the Nigerian, Ayotunde Obunabi, at Newham College in 1995 (from which both he and Ed Hussain, who interestinly cited the same example, are eager to distance from all personal responsibility). This incident is widely acknowledged as having no connection to HT, or its call, being rather a drugs related incident[93].

The current political climate is proving difficult for many who joined Islamic movements as a fad, forcefully arguing their case for change over many years, and then leaving to combat the movements they worked for. Maajid Nawaz, and more specifically, Ed Hussein and Shiraz Maher, have been courted by the political, intelligence and media hierarchy in Britain[94]. After Maajid and his colleagues were released and deported back to the UK, they were greeted at Heathrow airport by Special Branch officers who interviewed them for around three hours. There they had a DNA sample taken; were fingerprinted and asked about their political beliefs. Maajid claimed that the officers suggested he offer them his services[95]. This appears unusual for such an experienced organisation, unless one recalls that the British Consulate in Egypt tracked Maajid's progress throughout the trial period and beyond. Such an approach appears to be an attempt to verify the effect of the Egyptian prison reform programme on Maajid Unlike his friend Ed Hussain, who is quoted as willing to cooperate with intelligence services[96], Maajid is more discreet about his response to them. However his close relationship with Ed Hussain and articulation of ideas bear a remarkable similarity[97].

However his intended objective which he touches on in his introduction, ?Islam needs... a counter-reformation and a return to its true essence by Muslims insisting that their religion is not used merely to serve narrow political agendas?, is indicative that he has become a pawn in the newly emerging political landscape. This is also a consistent theme that appears in the comment section of his moderated blog judging by the small number of comments that have been approved [98]. He is currently coy about what he views as the true essence of Islam, but his friend Ed Hussain believes it to be a secular spiritual form of Islam with no political content, speaking in the New Statesman in June 2007, ?Islam, with its history of plurality and spirituality, has a natural home in Britain. Islamism, a political ideology set up to confront the West, does not?. Throwing caution to the winds, he goes on to say, ?...former Islamists can demolish the psychological confidence of extremists? and ?Just as we don't talk to the BNP to understand white, working-class grievances, we need not engage with Islamists to comprehend Muslim suffering?[99]. These comments resonate with Maajid?s Newsnight interview where he confirmed his intention of trying to ?convert? as many members of HT as possible.

The emergence of a new cadre of political actors, willing to work with the establishment to openly and intellectually counter efforts of those working to establish the Islamic Caliphate, is a new dimension to the UK political scene. History is said to repeat itself - those guilty of treason in the historic demise of the Ottoman Caliphate by working to further the interests of foreign powers, like the Egyptian Mohammed Ali, Mustapha Kemal Ataturk, Sharif Hussain and Abdul Aziz bin Saud walked a path not unlike that of their insignificant modern day counterparts Hamid Karzai, Nuri al-Maliki, Ed Hussain, Shiraz Maher, Hassan Butt and most recently, Maajid Nawaz.

?Religions are not for governments or states, they are for individuals. The state can assist individuals religious responsibilities, but governments cannot, should not, profess faith?, (Ed Hussain, The Islamist)

14. Conclusion

Maajid Nawaz?s article, "Evaluating Hizb ut-Tahrir's Theo-political Stance" contains a significant number of elementary mistakes, the research is selective, sources are misquoted and misportrayed, principles are misapplied and there is no referencing (including primary references) on a number of important citations[100]. Though the piece is presented in an "academic" style, it reads more as an undergraduate?s defence of the current despotic Middle Eastern regimes aimed at maintaining the status quo in the Muslim world, and maybe would have been more appropriately titled as such[101]. Although style is not a major consideration, utilization of an academic style implies the article is well researched, critical and neutral. Most of these criteria are not met by the article. This is no doubt due to the fact that Maajid?s academic background is lacking, having only in recent months been awarded his undergraduate degree after ten years of commencing it; no doubt his youthful diary was full of activities with little time devoted to study or development of intellectual and critical thinking.

It is not inconceivable that anyone including Maajid can show an error in HT methodology - however he has yet to show that he has identified any such error. Many activists when engaging with groups fail to undertake research, read or develop beyond the basic culture they are provided with, despite being strongly encouraged to do so[102]. They are therefore surprised and often disorientated when they discover the Islamic cultural heritage for the first time, shaken by its depth, breadth and sophistication of thought. Maajid appears to have been a victim of the same problem, as he mentions in his Newsnight interview[103], his enlightenment occurring having read some classical Islamic texts in prison[104], (or so he claims[105]). However he fails to have recognised the limitations of the self-taught, especially those who develop delusions of grandeur and high self worth ? in Maajid?s case this is seen in his miscitations of the books he read (or more probably lifted uncritically from other works), varying and twisting sharia principles and disputing decisive concepts.

Maajid expects the reader to believe that his lone experience with HT and its Islamist ideas are enough to make him an authority on the subject of Islamism. He attacks Islamism absolutely giving no consideration to the contribution made by successive generations of jurists, sufis, thinkers and writers in movements ranging from Morocco to Indonesia. In particular, he has failed to understand HT and its contribution to this organic process ? the creation of a political party built solely on Islam, embodying five decades of distillation and contemporisation of the strongest ideas from fourteen centuries of Islamic civilisation and scholarship to engage with the problems of modernity ? a challenge the Muslim world is attempting to collectively resolve.

The thrust of Maajid?s endeavours advocate a secularised Islamic theology, in a manner remarkably similar to that of his friend, Ed Hussain, tarnished as an establishment figure and attention seeker, labelled by some as an agent. Maajid?s close association with him and the proximity of ideas has left a similar indelible mark in relation to his writings and views ? his TimesOnline article reading very much like Ed Hussain?s, ?The Islamist?.

Maajid states the flaw he has found is "astoundingly obvious" for any trained practioner of the sharia[106], apparently missed by generations of thinkers, activists, critics and jurists, commenting, ?no one fully understanding what it is that Ĥizb ut-Taĥrīr actually believe?. However, there is a significant flaw in his journey of enlightenment from Islamism to secularism ? the attempted application of classical Islamic juristic texts relating to discussions and problems of a different milieu to a postmodern nihilistic world, which embodies an accumulation of experiences of enlightenment, modernity, ideological turbulence and civilizational conflict. One would have expected him to have done further research to ensure that maybe he had not misunderstood something "astoundingly obvious" before publicizing his embryonic views.

However, for the new cadre working against those advocating political reformation and change in the Muslim world, maybe this is not an important consideration...

"As for those who sell for a small price the covenant and faith they owe to Allah and their own plighted word for a small price, they shall have no portion in the Hereafter. Nor will Allah speak to them or look at them on the Day of Judgment, nor will He cleanse them: They shall have a grievous torment, a painful doom." [Quran 3:77]

[1] Muslim Public Opinion on US Policy, Attacks on Civilians and al Qaeda, http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/apr07/START_Apr07_rpt.pdf, reviewed 09/09/2007
[2] Including Hasan al-Banna, Mawdudi, Syed Qutb, Khomeini and al-Nabhani
[3] The Government?s Approach, http://press.homeoffice.gov.uk/Speeches/12-05-sp-terrorism-bill, reviewed 10/09/2007
[4] Notable examples including Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and members of al-Muhajiroon amongst others
[5] Blair launches fund to improve teaching of Islam, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,,2094977,00.html, reviewed 05/09/2007
[6] Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism, Noman Hanif, http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 12/09/2007
[7] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 01/09/2007
[8] From pg.5 of his article
[9] From pg.5 of his article
[10] Op Cit http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf
[11] Christian missionary movements also participated creating Catholic and Protestant colleges in the Levant including the American University in Beirut, St Joseph?s College in Lebanon. Roberts College in Turkey and Forman Christian College in Lahore.
[12] Marxist Fidaiyan-i Khalf of Iran, Parcham and Khalf parties in Afghanistan, Communist activists in Yemen and Turkey and guerrilla factions in Malaysia
[13] The British even had the Himalayan Gurkha soldiers continue to fight for them as recently as the Falkland War in 1982.
[14] However new legislation in 1998 curtailed much of its powers and autonomy
[15] The current American occupation of Iraq reflects this
[16] Ferguson, Niall, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin Books Ltd, 2004
[17] Esposito, J, The Oxford History of Islam, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 551-599
[18] Including but not limited to: Sayyid Ahmad Shahid (India 1786-1831), Mirza Hasan Shirazi (Iran 1815-94), Imam Shamil (Central Asia, 1796-1871), Amir Abd al-Qadir (Algeria, 1808-83), Mohammed ibn Abdille Hasan (Somaliland 1864-1920), Mahdi (Sudan, 1885), Uthman Dan Fodo (Nigeria, 1754-1817), Mohammed Iqbal (Pakistan, 1877-1938), Abul-Kalam Azad (1888-1958), Mawlana Husain Madani (India, 1879-1957) and Mawdudi (Pakistan, 1903-79)
[19] In which issues of knowledge, truth and certainty are discussed
[20] Presented by the founder father of Rationalism, Renes Descartes, in his Meditations, resonating a similar discussion of al-Ghazali in his autobiography, Munqid Min al-Dalal, an argument which Ghazali rejects
[21] Quran 102:5, 102:7 and 69:51
[22] This is supported by narrations from the Sunnah, for example, "O God, apportion to us such...certainty (of faith) that the calamities of this world will be made easy for us by Thee" Al-Tirmidhi, Hadith 783
[23] Elaborated in Shaksiyyah Islamiyyah (The Islamic Personality)
[24] Quran 5:38
[25] The twisting of ahadith to justify the abandonment of the Shariah , http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/twisting-of-ahadith-to-justify.html, reviewed 10/09/07
[26] Violated on occasions by some jurists historically like Ibn Hazm or Ibn Taymiyyah, who took more decisive approaches to matters
[27] Quran 12:40
[28] Quran 5:60
[29] Quran 5:44
[30] Quran 5: 49
[31] Quran 5:141
[32] Ibn al-Qayyim, Madaarij as-Saaliheen, 1/336-337
[33] Sharh At-tahaaweeyyah,pg.324
[34] Minhaj as-Sunnah, 5/pp.130-132
[35] Ibn Kathir, Tafseerul Quran ul Atheeem
[36] Al-Shawkani, Ar-Rasaa'il as-Salafiyah, pp.33-34
[37] Shaakir, A, Hukm Al-Jaahiliyah,pg.9
[38] Sovereignty for Allah being the popular phrase
[39] Nabhani, Taqiuddin, Party Structure, al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 1
[40] The adoption of Hamla Dawah tul-Islam wajibat wa sifaat (The way to carry the call ? its obligations & characteristics) by HT in 2001 was one that some of its members had problems with as it constituted the introduction of a set of concepts into HT rather than being simply the expression of personal thoughts of an individual ? it was subsequently removed from the adopted list of books
[41] Adoption in Hizb ut-Tahrir, pp. 1-2 ? it is published on the HT official website cited above
[42] Note 19
[43] Pg. 7 of his article
[44] The Islamic laws relating to Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr/Harb (referring to lands where Islam ruled and non-Islamic lands respectively) are detailed in these famous texts, written by jurists from across all the main schools of thought: Mughni, Kishaf Alqina An Matn Al-Iqna, Sharh Muntahi Al-Iradat, Insaaf, Al-Furu, Al-Iqna, Alsharh Al-Kabir, Al-Hashiya Al-Jamal, Nihayat Al-Muhtaj, Thufat Al-Muhta, Sharh Albahja, Al-Majmoo, Hawahshi Al-Sharawani, Iaana Al-Talibeen, Al-Umm, Radd Al-Muhtaar, Al-Bahr Al-Raiq, Fath Al-Qadir, Al-Jawhara Al-Neera, Badai Al-Sinaai, Al-Mabsoot, Tuhfa Al-Fuqaha
[45] See section 9 for a detailed discussion of terms and definitions
[46] Examples including Dar al-Amn (Abode of Security), Dar al-Silm (Abode of Peace), Dar al-Muwada?ah (Abode of Mmutual Peace), Dar Al-?Ahd (Abode of Covenant), Dar Al-Sulh (Abode of Truce), Dar Al-Maslubah (Abode of Pillaged Land), Dar Al-Bid?ah (Abode of Heresy), Dar Al-?Adl (Abode of Justice), Dar al-Kufr (Abode of Unbelief) etc.
[47] The most pervasive mention of the terms Dar al-Islam and Dar al-harb are to be found in the siyar or maghazi literature or under the section of jihad in fiqh books (where jurists classified the wider rules of international relations, including rules regarding treaties, ceasefire, asylum and international trade).
[48] The Dar Paradigm and Identity, http://abuismael.blogspot.com/2007/08/dar-paradigm-and-identity.html, reviewed 08/09/07
[49] Tariq Ramadan states: ?The concepts of Dar al-Islam, Dar al-harb, and Dar al-?ahd were not described in the Qur?an or in the Sunna. In fact they constituted a human attempt, at a moment in history, to describe the world and to provide the Muslim community with a geopolitical scheme that appropriate to the reality of the time. This reality has completely changed?, Ramadan, Tariq, Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (Oxford University Press, 2004) pg.69.
[50] Additionally, the following texts have been cited in this discussion:
?Those who do not govern with what Allah has revealed, they are the disbelievers? [Al-Maida:44]
?Allah will not allow the disbelievers to have an authority over the believers? [An-Nisa:141]
Junada b. abi Umayyah who said: "...the Messenger of Allah (saw) called upon us and we gave him the Bai?ah, ...and that we should not dispute the authority of its people unless we saw open Kufr upon which we had a proof from Allah" (Al-Bukhari). Anas narrated that: ?Wherever the Prophet (saw) raided some people he would not raid except in the morning. If he heard the Adhan he would refrain, and if he did not he would invade after dawn?.
And it was narrated by Essam Almusny, who said: ?The Prophet (saw) used to tell to the expeditions that he sent: ?If you` have seen a mosque or heard a call for prayer, then do not kill anybody.??
Once Abdul Rahman bin ?Awf was speaking with Caliph Umar (ra), he said, ?Do not be harsh on them (speaking about some of the Hujaaj) until they return to Madinah, which is Dar al-Hijrah, Dar al-Sunnah and Dar ul-Salaama.? [Sahih Bukhari Hadith no. 3713]
Jaabir bin Ziyaad reported that Ibn Abbas (ra) said, ?The Prophet (saw), Abu Bakr and Umar (ra) where from the Muhajireen because they migrated from the Mushrikeen. Amongst the Ansaar were also people who migrated because at that time Madinah was Dar ul-Shirk and they came to the Prophet(saw) on the night of the Bay?ah al-Aqabah.? [an-Nisa?i]
[51] Ibid. cited from Sahih Muslim, Hadith no. 4294
[52] Quran 8:61
[53] Hence the usage of terms unipolar, bipolar or statist paradigms
[54] Ibid.
[55] Ibn Qayyim, Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah, Vol. 1, p.366
[56] ?Methodology of Hizb ut-Tahrir for Change? is the revised name of the same book
[57] Al-Jurjani, Ali bin Mohammed al-Sharif al defines it in a similar manner in his ?Kitab al-Tarifat?, 1969, Maktaba Lubnaan, Arabic Edition, pg. 64, namely that ?a definition is a statement expressing an understanding in terms of another thing?
[58] These definitions are generally required to adhere to basic rules to ensure they are meaningful and useful . Traditionally the following conditions have been imposed:
1. A definition must set out the essential attributes of the thing defined.
2. Definitions should avoid circularity.
3. The definition must not be too wide or too narrow (jami/mani). It must be applicable to everything to which the defined term applies and to no other objects.
4. The definition must not be obscure. The purpose of a definition is to explain the meaning of a term which may be obscure or difficult, by the use of terms that are commonly understood and whose meaning is clear.
5. A definition should not be negative where it can be positive.
(http://www.reference.com/search?q=definition, reviewed 08/09/2007)
[59] al-Jurjani op. cit. pg. 181
[60] Mujizat al-Quran, Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti has a similar understanding in his al-Itiqan fi 'ulum al-Qur?an, (2 vol. Cairo, 1951/1370)
[61] Sayf al-Deen al-Aamidi, Al-Ihkaam, 1/28 and Rawdat al-Nathir by Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi 1/178
[62] Al-`Inayah published on the margins of Fath al-Qadeer (2/142) and Hashiyat Ibn `Abideen (2/268)
[63] Zayla`i?s Tabyeen al-Haqa?iq, (1/247). See also Al-Bahr al-Ra?iq (2/211)]
[64] Dardeer?s Al-Sharh al-Kabeer, (1/425)
[65] Mughni al-Muhtaj (1/350) and Fath al-Bari (6/129)
[66] Fath al-Bari (6/43)
[67] Kash-shaf al-Qina`, 2/113 and Al-Mughni (2/206)
[68] Abu Hanifa being an example
[69] Pg. 7 of his article
[70] Maajid seems to be emulating his colleague Ed Hussain... ?Husain has said that he does not accept the concept of the Caliphate or an Islamic State. He misrepresented Shaykh Hamza Yusuf by alleging that he said that there was "no such thing as an Islamic state". When questioned on DeenPort as to whether the Caliphate was fard kifayah, as discussed by the classical scholars, Husain says that he does not discuss in terms of fard ain or fard kifayah. Husain writes that the Islamic state "is not a rukn of the deen and without it the deen is not lost. An individual can remain a firm believer, a mutadayyin, without the imam and the jama'ah." However, the classical scholar, Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud bin Umar al-Taftazani, wrote, "There is consensus that appointing a Caliph is obligatory. The difference of opinion is on whether the appointment must be by Allah or by his servants, and whether the basis (for appointment) is textual evidence or rational proof. The adoption is that it is obligatory upon the servants by textual evidence because of the saying of the Messenger, ?Whoever dies not having known the Imam of his time, dies the death of the days of ignorance.?? http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/showthread.php?t=22827&page=2
[71] Shawkani, Nayl al-Awtar, Vol 4, Book 8, Dar al-Fikr, 2000, pg. 24
[72] Ibn Qayyim, Kitaab Ahkaam ahl al-Dhimmah, Vol. 1, p.366
[73] Majid omits aspects of HT?s quote ? the full quote is presented here with the omissions, reflecting how closely aligned HT?s position is with the classic scholars
[74] Pp. 9-12 of his article
[75] Clarifying the meaning of Dar al-Kufr & Dar al-Islam , http://www.khilafah.com/kcom/islamic-thoughts/islamic-thoughts/clarifying-the-meaning-of-dar-al-kufr--dar-al-islam.html, reviewed 13/09/07
[76] Shaksiyyah Islamiyya, Volume 2, pg. 249
[77] al-Mu?atamad fil Usul ad-Deen, pg. 276
[78] al-Sayl Jaraar, Vol. 1, pg. 576
[79] Sayyid Qutb, In the Shade of the Qur?an, Vol. 2 pg. 874
[80] Ibid., pp. 191-194
[81] Ibid. pp. 196-197
[82] Ibid. pp. 197-199
[83] Structuring of a Party (Attakattul el-Hizbi, tr. From 4th edition), 2001, Al-Khilafah Publications, pg. 6
[84] Oh! What a Lovely War on Terror - it's the number the arms dealers love, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/columnist/story/0,,2168993,00.html, reviewed 14/09/2007
[85] Hizb ut-Tahrir--The Next al-Qaeda, Really?, http://hei.unige.ch/psio/fichiers/Meyer%20Al%20Qaida.pdf, reviewed 14/09/2007
[86] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Monographs/HizbutahrirIslamsPoliticalInsurgency.pdf
[87] http://www.nixoncenter.org/Program%20Briefs/PB%202004/confrephiztahrir.pdf
[88] International Crisis Group (ICG), Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir. ICG Asia
Report, No. 58, 30 June 2003. The report is available from the ICG website: http://www.crisisweb.org.
[89] Made none the easier by HT publicising his and his co-defendants plight internationally
[90] Attending public appearances advocating HT ideas at events organized by HT whilst collaborating with those who had left the party, secretly attending meetings and discussions and other such subversive and clandestine activities
[91] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021105/debtext/21105-37.htm
[92] Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate, Grey Seal, 1996
[93] Despite so, Ed Hussain and Maajid Nawaz both attempt to make this tenuous connection by citing HT created an atmosphere that led to this incident
[94] Ex-Islamists Inc : Fabricating a Link Between Hizb-ut-Tahrir and Terrorism, Nomaan Hanif, http://www.icssa.org/article_detail_parse.php?a_id=1144&rel=1136,1129, reviewed 14/09/2007
[95] Who?s Listening to Whom? http://www.bbc.co.uk/london/content/articles/2006/03/14/kurt_met_police_trust_feature.shtml, reviewed 14/09/07.
[96] In his interview with the New York Times, Husain explained that he had been approached by British government officials to join their "anti-extremist efforts". In an interview with Sky's Adam Boulton, Husain did not deny Boulton's suggestion that he has been called in by "Gordon Brown or government".
[97] In an interview with altmuslim.com, Husain says, "In this, I'm backed by Maajid Nawaz who, alhamdulillah, recently left Hizb-ut-Tahrir partly as a result of conversations we had about these issues, and more importantly, his exposure to traditional Islam in all its diversity. Soon, Maajid will speak publicly and I ask Hizb members and others to listen and learn from Maajid's wisdom, knowledge, and experience.?
[98] http://www.maajidnawaz.blogspot.com/, A section that is allegedly subject to rigorous editorial control with many comments not being posted or heavily edited to suit before being presented - a number of sites by his colleagues/sub-editors have been set up with similar views, including: http://www.tftd.ws/ , http://www.jargonistic.com/ and http://rashadzamanali.blogspot.com/2007/09/rashad-zaman-ali-khilafah-is.html
[99] New Statesmen, 14 June 2007
[100] For instance the quote "opposing views are based on Kufr" is incorrectly attributed to HT who are amongst the most liberal thinking when it comes to entertaining alternative views
[101] As such, a host of comments have been made on various internet sites - blogs have even appeared satirizing the immature and na?ve stance Majid and his cadre has taken, examples including:
http://www.maajidnawaaz.blogspot.com/, reviewed 19/09/2007
[102] Ed Hussain's book, The Islamist, (to which Maajid contributed) reflects this problem with the frequent jumps from one position to the other.
[103] BBC Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman, http://search.bbc.co.uk/cgi-bin/search/results.pl?scope=all&edition=d&tab=all&recipe=all&q=maajid+nawaz, reviewed 11/09/2007
[104] Why I joined the British jihad - and why I rejected it, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article2459969.ece, reviewed 16/09/2007
[105] Leading militant in split with Islamists, http://www.guardian.co.uk/religion/Story/0,,2165546,00.html, reviewed 12/09/2007
[106] Something he considers to be given his stint in prison where he "studied" sharia and his Arabic/Law studies at the British establishment SOAS

27-09-2007, 16:32
Its too bad HT didn't present this in press release form to Newsnight in response to the interview.

The official response by HT on Newsnight was a failure: a sorry, missed opportunity.

05-10-2007, 00:12
A Ramadan radio station has invited Majid Nawaz to be interviewed as a guest. I found this information about the show on another forum and at the bottom of this message have pasted the link through which you'd be able to listen to the show inshallah:

Tough Talk is a hard hitting show which has controversial guests on who are publicly known for their views and grills them to get down to the nitty gritty of why they hold the views they do and whether they really think thats the way forward for the muslim community!

Friday's guest (ie. tomorrow!!! ) is Majid Nawaz.

Majid Nawaz is an ex member of th group Hizb ut Tahrir. His is a 'kiss n tell' approach to leaving the group!

Join the team to ask your questions and find out what it was like why he left what he thinks now... or anything else you want to ask!!!


05-10-2007, 12:27
UNITY SAID..."look at some of the others threads on this forum for example, people defending OBL and "Al-Qaeda" like there is no tomorrow, even though actions of such groups clearly benefits the Kuffar more then the Ummah." I THINK THIS IS AN EXCELLENT POINT!!!!!!!!!!!!!

20-07-2013, 01:46
"Following my confirmation as the Liberal Democrat candidate for Hampstead and Kilburn, I am looking forward to running for public office. Quilliam will remain a priority for me because its values shape my beliefs and outlook.


Amazing how someone can do such a U-turn on ideas!! Now a pro-democracy campaigner, Majid Nawaz is not popular amongst Muslims in the UK, which means his only hope of "little" success in politics is very unlikely.

His mission would be to keep instilling the democratic values into Mulsims who lend him an ear and combat "political" Islam. Not long before he will find himself in the middle, rejected by both the kufar (who he works with) and the Muslims.